Bottom Line Up Front
Vladimir Putin’s working visit to Dushanbe on 20 November, made the day after he, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump issued a symbolic “peace declaration” in Shenzhen, was the defining event of the past 72 hours in Central Asia. It was a deliberate demonstration that Moscow still regards Tajikistan, and by extension the Afghan frontier, as the anchor of its southern security perimeter. In his talks with Emomali Rahmon the Russian leader covered migration, the Afghan border and the future of the 201st Military Base, which the Kremlin calls Russia’s largest military installation abroad, according to The Times of Central Asia. We judge with high confidence that the visit was intended to show that the Shenzhen great-power détente does not dilute Russia’s claim to primacy in the region’s hard security, and with moderate confidence that it signals a Russian push to deepen the CSTO footprint on the Tajik-Afghan border over the winter.
Elsewhere the economic signals diverged. S&P raised Uzbekistan to BB+, its highest sovereign rating to date and one notch below investment grade, as Gazeta.uz and Trend reported, even as its gas exports to China fell almost 40 percent in ten months. Kazakhstan, still absorbing the 12 November detentions at the top of Samruk-Kazyna and the national railway, faces a weaker oil year and IMF pressure for tighter money. Kyrgyzstan is growing at a double-digit pace into a presidential election on 27 January 2027, and Tajikistan’s imports are outrunning exports roughly four to one. On water, Tashkent publicly played down the near-term threat from Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa canal while keeping binding water-sharing talks on the table.
For Southeast Asia and Indonesia, the takeaways are a more bankable Uzbekistan, a Middle Corridor that keeps growing from a small base, and a Russian security posture on the Afghan frontier that bears on the counter-terrorism interests of Muslim-majority states across Asia. Our overall assessment for the next 72 hours is continuity with elevated risk, with the Kazakh elite reshuffle, the CSTO’s Afghan file and the Kyrgyz campaign the threads most likely to produce surprises.
Great-Power Competition
The Shenzhen meeting framed the week. According to Al-Monitor, the three leaders declared that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, committed to an open-ended dialogue on nuclear risk reduction, pledged to advance UN reform, promised to increase fuel product supplies for all countries and to uphold the immunity of state officials before international courts. The text did not mention Ukraine, Iran or Central Asia, and Putin conceded it bound no one. Its regional significance is atmospheric. Central Asian multi-vector diplomacy assumes that Washington, Beijing and Moscow compete for the region’s favour; a period in which the three talk directly lowers the premium on that competition and raises the value of being indispensable to each separately. We assess with moderate confidence that this will make regional governments more eager to lock in bilateral deals before any great-power understanding narrows their room for manoeuvre.
Putin’s onward flight to Dushanbe made the point concrete. Rahmon called Russia a “strategic partner and reliable ally”, the two leaders backed the continued presence of the 201st base and Putin invited senior officials to discuss military cooperation, according to The Times of Central Asia. Putin said bilateral trade grew by more than a quarter in 2025 and by nearly 19 percent in the first nine months of 2026, and remittances, overwhelmingly from Russia, equalled 57.7 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2025, the highest share of any country. Four days before the visit the European Union froze the assets of Unistream, a Russian money-transfer service widely used by Tajik migrants, which the company contests. We judge with high confidence that migration and remittances will remain Russia’s most effective instrument in Tajikistan, more durable than arms deliveries or base agreements.
The visit followed the CSTO Collective Security Council in Moscow on 11 November, where Putin said member states were “closely monitoring” Afghanistan as part of strengthening the organisation’s external borders, according to Afghanistan International. The context, set out in our 10 November update and our 19 November update, is a year of repeated cross-border incidents and a long-running CSTO effort to equip Tajik border guards. Eurasianet reported in June that the head of the CSTO Permanent Council called Afghanistan “the main challenge” in the organisation’s Central Asian zone and that some attacks had targeted Chinese work crews, killing five people. Russia’s capacity to deliver more than political cover remains constrained by the war in Ukraine. The practical question is whether Moscow will commit personnel or mainly hardware and intelligence-sharing.
Uzbekistan continues to show the region’s most sophisticated balancing. A Senate committee reviewed on 12 November a bill to ratify the SCO agreement creating a Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats in Tashkent, extending the existing Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure into information security and organised crime, according to The Times of Central Asia. The same analysis notes that China took 23.2 percent of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade in January to September against Russia’s 16 percent, that a package of 54 US-Uzbek agreements worth about 12 billion dollars was announced on 19 October with priorities in critical minerals, energy, data centres and AI, and that Chinese lenders hold roughly a tenth of Uzbekistan’s 40.71 billion dollars of public and guaranteed debt. We assess with high confidence that Tashkent will keep deepening SCO security ties and American commercial ties at once, and sees no contradiction between them.
Türkiye and the Gulf were active on the economic side. Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz met Mirziyoyev in Tashkent on 19 November, and Oman and Uzbekistan set up a joint business council after the Uzbek president’s visit to Muscat, according to items in the monitor. These ties add to, rather than compete with, the great powers, and the trend of Gulf capital and Turkish industry building positions across the region strengthened slightly in this window.
Security, Borders and Militancy
The Tajik-Afghan frontier remains the region’s principal external security concern. Rahmon briefed Putin on security incidents and smuggling along the border. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said a degree of stability remained and stressed cooperation between border and intelligence services, according to The Times of Central Asia. The monitor also recorded Afghan outlets reporting that Taliban officials rejected CSTO concerns about the border. That is consistent with Kabul’s standing position that no threats originate from Afghan territory, although we could not open the original report. Our judgement, held with moderate confidence, is that the risk of further small-scale incidents in Tajikistan’s Khatlon and Gorno-Badakhshan border districts is elevated through the winter. These are more likely to involve smuggling networks and armed groups operating beyond effective Taliban control than any deliberate Taliban policy. The risk of a major cross-border offensive remains low.
The Ferghana Valley showed the reverse trend. Officials in Kyrgyzstan reported no border incidents on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border in 2026, the border agencies of both countries held a military council in Osh, and a new customs and logistics terminal opened at Ken-Sai on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek frontier, according to items from AKIpress and open.kg collected by the monitor. Since the delimitation agreements of recent years, the Kyrgyz-Uzbek boundary has gone from a flashpoint to a working frontier, and the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, settled by treaty in March 2025, saw no reported incidents in this window. We assess with high confidence that interstate border violence in the Ferghana Valley is at its lowest level since independence, and that this is now a structural rather than a cyclical improvement.
Security services kept up routine pressure on unregistered religious groups and organised crime. Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security said it had halted a seven-member banned religious group, and in a notable case of official accountability a former commander of the Kyrgyz Air Force was arrested over a military helicopter crash, according to open.kg and AKIpress reports in the monitor. Uzbekistan announced plans for migrant deportation facilities in six regions, and Kazakhstan presented its programme for reintegrating citizens returned from conflict zones. These are the signals of confident services focused on control rather than reacting to a live extremist threat. We assess with moderate confidence that the risk of a mass-casualty attack inside Central Asia over the next 72 hours is low, with diaspora networks in Russia and Türkiye the more significant recruitment vector.
Kazakhstan took delivery of a Chinese Y-9E military transport aircraft, which sits between its Airbus C-295 and A400M fleets, according to Caspian Post, citing Qazinform and the Ministry of Defence. The purchase is modest but widens China’s defence-industrial presence in a CSTO member, and we judge with moderate confidence that Astana is deliberately spreading its defence suppliers as it spreads its export routes.
Bilateral friction between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan surfaced in an unusual form. A Kazakh court sentenced an Uzbek international relations scholar who worked at an Astana university to ten years for espionage after a closed trial, according to Zamin.uz. Relatives say they have not seen the case materials and will appeal, colleagues say his critical-minerals research relied on open sources, and neither government has commented. With bilateral trade up 28.6 percent to 4.3 billion dollars in nine months, according to Trend in the monitor, we judge with moderate confidence that both sides will keep the case at the consular level, but it shows how far security services now treat critical-minerals knowledge as a strategic asset.
Connectivity: the Caspian, the Middle Corridor, Pipelines and Transit
The Middle Corridor’s growth continued from a small base. Kazakhstan’s container shipments rose 8 percent to 1.234 million TEU in January to October, and Trans-Caspian traffic rose 64 percent to 57,300 TEU, against 0.7 percent growth to 454,000 TEU on China-Russia routes and 4.8 percent to 404,000 TEU on China-Europe routes, according to Ministry of Transport figures reported by The Times of Central Asia. Astana’s target of 300,000 TEU a year by 2029 is roughly five times this year’s pace, so the Mointy-Kyzylzhar railway due by end-2026 and the Bakhty-Ayagoz line with a third Chinese border crossing in 2027 are the projects to watch. We judge with high confidence that the corridor will keep outgrowing the northern route, and with moderate confidence that it will remain a minor share of Kazakhstan’s China-Europe volume through 2028 unless Caspian port and ferry capacity expand faster than planned.
Turkmenistan used its hosting of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly in Awaza, where its Mejlis gained observer status, to stress its role as a transit state. At the seventh Turkmen-Kyrgyz intergovernmental commission in Ashgabat on 18 and 19 November, the two sides signed a protocol on trade, energy, transport and logistics and discussed wider use of Turkmenbashi port on preferential terms, according to Trend and AKIpress. Kyrgyzstan’s National Electric Grid and Turkmenenergo signed a separate agreement, and Turkmen power supplies to Kyrgyzstan run under an intergovernmental deal valid to the end of 2026. Officials also discussed carrying freight from the planned China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, estimated at 4.7 billion dollars according to The Times of Central Asia, onward through Turkmen ports to Azerbaijan. Turkmenbashi is emerging as the southern Caspian complement to Aktau and Kuryk.
The trans-Afghan corridor is moving from rhetoric to technical planning but remains hostage to Afghan-Pakistani relations. Kazakhstan is willing to invest up to 500 million dollars in the roughly 75-mile Torghundi-Herat line, a 27-mile Khaf-Herat link to Iran opened in late September, and a private proposal for a Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak line is costed at 4.1 billion dollars with construction targeted for 2027 to 2029, according to The Times of Central Asia. The same report notes that the main Afghan-Pakistani crossings have been closed to regular trade for more than a year since the clashes of October 2025, which is why we judge with high confidence that no trans-Afghan rail route to the Arabian Sea will carry commercial freight before the end of the decade. Afghan outlets also reported further Turkmen-Taliban talks on speeding up the TAPI gas pipeline, which we treat as a statement of intent rather than evidence of progress.
Kazakhstan’s oil export system remains the region’s most exposed infrastructure. Drone strikes on tankers at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal near Novorossiysk earlier this year forced loadings to stop, and in July daily output fell by more than half during a week-long suspension, according to Reuters as published by The Standard. The CPC carries more than 80 percent of Kazakh oil exports, and the 2026 production plan was cut to 96 million tonnes, according to Qazinform. A report circulating in the monitor on 19 November described a fresh output plunge after a terminal closure; we could not confirm a new closure in this window and treat it as unverified. Shipments of Kazakh and Turkmen oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline rose 13 percent, according to Report.az in the monitor, but the trans-Caspian route cannot replace the CPC at scale.
Country Watch
Kazakhstan is the country to watch most closely, because its political system is in its most consequential reshuffle since January 2022. The 12 November arrests by the National Security Committee of Samruk-Kazyna chairman Nurlan Zhakupov and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy chief Yelzhas Otynshiyev on corruption charges were followed by an extraordinary Security Council meeting at which President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called corruption the “Achilles heel” of state companies and set 24 November as the deadline for proposals to curb it, according to RFE/RL. Samruk-Kazyna held about 87.5 billion dollars in assets at the end of 2025, and the rail operator had been preparing an IPO of up to 20 percent of its shares. As set out in our 16 November update, Tokayev then replaced the head of the security service, and commentary in the monitor, including a Eurasianet analysis, describes a contest playing out behind closed doors. We judge with moderate confidence that the campaign is primarily about consolidating presidential control over the state’s economic commanding heights and only secondarily about corruption as such.
Uzbekistan presents the region’s strongest macroeconomic story and its sharpest energy vulnerability. The S&P upgrade rests on growth averaging about 6 percent a year since 2017, 8.3 percent in the first nine months of 2026, a fiscal deficit near 3 percent of GDP and net government debt projected at 26 percent of GDP by 2029, according to Trend, while S&P flagged gold-price sensitivity and state-enterprise liabilities as the main risks, according to Gazeta.uz. Against this, gas exports to China fell 39.7 percent to 420.4 million dollars in January to October, according to Chinese customs data reported by Kursiv, and Uzbekistan’s own gas imports rose 49.9 percent to more than 1.6 billion dollars through September. We assess with high confidence that Tashkent will keep diverting gas to domestic use this winter, and with moderate confidence that winter shortages, not rating agencies, will be the more immediate test of public confidence in reform.
Kyrgyzstan is in campaign mode. The presidential election is set for 27 January 2027; eleven hopefuls filed nomination papers and four had passed the 30,000-signature threshold by 19 November, according to Economist.kg. President Sadyr Japarov, seeking a second term, met the hopefuls and told civil servants that “my participation in the presidential election does not oblige you to work for me personally”. GDP grew 10.5 percent in January to October, according to AKIpress, though ING warns of overheating with inflation at 8.8 percent since December, according to Trend. The cabinet’s decision to give ElCat an indefinite monopoly over international internet traffic, reported by AKIpress and Economist.kg in the monitor, deserves attention during the campaign. We judge with high confidence that Japarov will win, and with moderate confidence that the main risk to a smooth vote lies in elite rivalries rather than street opposition.
Tajikistan’s economy is growing on remittances and imports. The trade deficit widened almost 53 percent to 7.06 billion dollars in January to October, with imports up 41.2 percent to 9.42 billion dollars against exports of 2.36 billion dollars, according to The Times of Central Asia. Trade with China rose 53.1 percent to 3.34 billion dollars, confirming China as the largest trading partner, and the World Bank estimates that remittances more than offset the deficit in the first half. The Putin visit and the EU action against Unistream are therefore directly tied to the Tajik current account. We assess with high confidence that the external position is sustainable while migrant flows to Russia hold, with a sharp tightening of Russian migration policy the main threat.
Turkmenistan was visible mainly through state media, which emphasised the CIS assembly, trade and energy deals with Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, a hydrogen and customs dialogue with Japan, and Ashgabat’s wish to hold the next Caspian summit in person. We assess with moderate confidence that Ashgabat is using the CIS framework and its neutrality brand as diplomatic cover for transit projects running through Afghanistan and the Caspian, while China remains the dominant buyer of its gas.
Economy, Energy, Remittances and Markets
Currency markets were calm across the region over the window. According to ExchangeRate-API data recorded by the monitor, per US dollar, the Kazakh tenge stood at 449.95 (a change of 0.02 percent on the previous day), the Uzbek som at 11,987.91 (0.17 percent), the Kyrgyz som at 87.45 (0.02 percent), the Tajik somoni at 9.21 (virtually unchanged) and the Turkmen manat at 3.50 at its managed rate. The Russian rouble stood at 82.06 and the Chinese yuan at 6.69, while the Indonesian rupiah was at 18,291.41, a 0.16 percent move on the day. The absence of currency stress in Uzbekistan despite falling gold exports is notable. Trend, citing ING in the monitor, reported that gold exports had dropped 79 percent while capital inflows supported the som, which is consistent with S&P’s emphasis on improving external buffers.
Kazakhstan’s macroeconomic picture is weaker. The IMF concluded its 4 to 17 November consultations by saying that “a higher policy rate appears warranted”, with inflation at 9.2 percent in October against a 5 percent target, according to The Times of Central Asia. The National Bank has cut its base rate four times this year to 15.75 percent and decides next on 4 December, while real growth slowed from 6.5 percent in 2025 to about 4.5 percent in the first ten months of 2026 because of oil disruptions. Oil and condensate output fell 6.8 percent to 77.91 million tonnes in January to October, according to Trend, and exports of crude and products fell 5.43 percent to 53.12 million tonnes in nine months, according to Trend. We judge with moderate confidence that the National Bank will hold on 4 December rather than tighten into slowing growth and a political reshuffle, leaving inflation above 8 percent well into 2027.
Kyrgyzstan’s boom carries its own risks: a 12-month trade deficit of about 11 billion dollars and public debt that ING says has more than doubled since 2021 to 10.29 billion dollars, according to Trend items in the monitor. Uzbekistan’s exports rose 33 percent to 25.7 billion dollars in January to October, driven heavily by gold and services. Across the region, remittances from Russia remain the shock absorber for Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan, and in this window the threat to that channel came from European sanctions on Russian payment providers. We judge with moderate confidence that further Western sanctions on Russian payment intermediaries are the most underappreciated economic risk for the poorer Central Asian states in 2027.
Water, Climate, Disasters and Environmental Risk
Water diplomacy produced the window’s most substantive statement. Uzbekistan’s Minister of Water Resources Shavkat Khamraev said on 19 November that Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa canal has not yet taken “a single bucket” of Amu Darya water and will certainly not do so before 2030, and that the two countries will sign water-sharing agreements once construction is complete, according to Kun.uz. Afghan estimates put potential intake at about 10 billion cubic metres in wet years and 6 billion in dry years, and the minister suggested Uzbekistan could offer agricultural help in return for lower dry-year withdrawals. The monitor also flagged a Daryo report of the minister voicing concern about Tajikistan’s Rogun dam, which we could not open. With Uzbekistan facing a deficit of up to 15 billion cubic metres by 2030, according to AKIpress in the monitor, we assess with high confidence that Tashkent aims to bind the Taliban into a negotiated framework before the canal operates rather than confront Kabul.
Kazakhstan continued to promote its proposed international water organisation ahead of the UN Water Conference in December, and Tokayev called water security “a matter of survival” for Central Asia, according to Qazinform items in the monitor. The shrinking Caspian Sea also matters for connectivity, because falling water levels constrain draught at Aktau, Kuryk and Turkmenbashi, the ports on which the Middle Corridor depends.
The seismic picture was quiet. The monitor recorded no USGS earthquakes of magnitude 4.5 or above in the window, only light tremors of magnitude 3.0 to 3.9 near Osh and Kara-Kul in Kyrgyzstan, in Gorno-Badakhshan and in Afghan Badakhshan, with no reported damage. Kazakhstan’s weather service warned of fog, black ice and wet snow, a seasonal hazard for road freight. Winter energy security is the larger climate-linked risk, given Uzbekistan’s gas deficit, Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on reservoir levels and Turkmen electricity, and Tajikistan’s habitual winter power limits. We assess with moderate confidence that localised energy shortages and public frustration in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are more likely than in a normal winter.
Implications for Southeast Asia and Indonesia
For Southeast Asian governments and investors, the S&P upgrade makes Uzbekistan a more bankable partner. A BB+ sovereign with an improved transfer and convertibility assessment lowers the cost of trade finance and project lending for regional banks and for Islamic finance institutions, which already have a growing presence in Uzbekistan’s banking sector. Indonesian and Malaysian sukuk issuers and halal-economy firms have an opportunity to position themselves before the country reaches investment grade, which the agency now places one notch away. We assess with moderate confidence that the window for early-mover advantage in Uzbek Islamic finance and halal supply chains will narrow over the next two years as Gulf and Turkish capital moves in.
Connectivity between the regions is growing through aviation rather than freight. Kazakhstan’s Vice Minister of Transport invited Singaporean airlines to consider nonstop service to Astana and Almaty in talks with Singapore’s Civil Aviation Authority at an ICAO conference in Montreal, according to Trend, and SCAT Airlines has flown a Shymkent-Sanya-Singapore route twice weekly since October. The monitor also recorded Kyrgyz-Malaysian talks on rail freight and a report by Indonesian state broadcaster RRI of an Indonesian honorary consul in Kyrgyzstan, which we could not independently confirm, alongside new academic links between Indonesian universities and institutions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the human infrastructure on which trade between these Muslim-majority societies will rest.
The security implications are more serious. Hardening the Tajik-Afghan border while the Taliban insist no threat emanates from Afghanistan leaves transnational jihadist networks unaddressed, and those networks have historically recruited Central Asians and reached into Southeast Asia through online propaganda and diaspora links. Indonesia’s counter-terrorism agencies have a direct interest in the information-security and organised-crime remit of the proposed SCO centre in Tashkent and should seek practical channels to it as a non-member. On energy, the Shenzhen pledge to raise fuel product supplies would help fuel-importing Southeast Asian economies at the margin if it produces anything concrete, but the vulnerability of Kazakhstan’s CPC exports is a reminder that Black Sea disruptions feed into crude prices that Indonesia, a net oil importer with the rupiah at 18,291 to the dollar, can ill afford.
Indicators and Warnings for the Next 72 Hours
In Kazakhstan, the key signpost is the 24 November deadline for government proposals on corruption in state companies. Watch for further detentions at Samruk-Kazyna subsidiaries, a formal decision to postpone or cancel the KTZ IPO, new appointments to the fund’s board, and any statement by Tokayev that links the campaign to his constitutional reform agenda. A sudden detention of a figure associated with the former ruling family would indicate that the campaign has widened from economic governance into elite politics. In energy, any new notice from the CPC on suspended loadings at Novorossiysk, or a statement from the Energy Ministry on adjusted output, would be an immediate signal for both Kazakh growth and the tenge.
On the Afghan frontier, watch for announcements from Moscow or Dushanbe on CSTO personnel or equipment following the Putin-Rahmon talks, for Tajik border-guard reports of clashes or smuggling seizures, and for any Taliban response to the CSTO. A reported attack on Chinese workers in the border zone would be the most dangerous single indicator, because it could draw Beijing into a direct security role. On migration, watch for Russian measures to shield remittance channels from Western sanctions.
In Kyrgyzstan, watch the Central Election Commission’s final candidate registration, any disqualification of prominent hopefuls and any security case touching political figures. In Uzbekistan, watch for gas rationing, power cuts or emergency imports as temperatures drop, for new Eurobond plans after the S&P upgrade, and for final Senate ratification of the SCO security centre agreement. On water, a formal request for trilateral talks with Afghanistan on Qosh Tepa, or a Tajik statement on Rogun reservoir filling, would show the issue moving from rhetoric to negotiation. In Turkmenistan, a date for the Caspian summit and any concrete TAPI milestone are the items to watch.
Method and Sources
This update covers the 72 hours from 17:41 WIB on 19 November to 17:41 WIB on 22 November 2026 and draws on 1,390 signals from 269 sources collected by the KBA13 Central Asia Intelligence Monitor: 473 on Uzbekistan, 414 on Kazakhstan, 279 on Kyrgyzstan, 187 on Turkmenistan and 145 on Tajikistan. Key developments were checked against the original publishers’ articles, and against two or more independent sources where possible. State-controlled or state-aligned outlets are treated as statements of official position, and items we could not open or confirm are labelled in the text. Exchange rates are per US dollar from ExchangeRate-API as recorded by the monitor; seismic data are from USGS and Volcano Discovery.
About The Author
- Series · Seri
- KBA13 Insight Update, Central Asia Edition
- Volume · Number
- Vol. 2, No. 70 (November 2026)
- Cumulative issue · Edisi ke-
- 82
- Reference · Nomor rujukan
KBA13-IU-2026-02-070- Author · Penulis
- KBA13 Insight Research Team
- Published · Terbit
- 22 November 2026
- Section · Rubrik
- KBA13 Insight Update, KBA13 Insight Update International
- Keywords · Kata kunci
- Afghanistan, Central Asia, CSTO, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Middle Corridor, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
- Language · Bahasa
- English
- Length · Panjang
- 4,223 words · ±19 min read
- Publisher · Penerbit
- KBA13 Insight, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
- Permalink
- www.kba13.com/kba13-insight-update-2026-11-22-central-asia/
- How to cite · Cara mengutip
- KBA13 Insight Research Team. (2026, November 22). KBA13 Insight Update – 22 November 2026: Central Asia – Putin Carries the Shenzhen Détente to Dushanbe as Moscow Reasserts Its Afghan-Border Role. KBA13 Insight Update, 2(70). https://www.kba13.com/kba13-insight-update-2026-11-22-central-asia/
- Rights · Hak cipta
- © 2026 KBA13 Insight. Quotation permitted with full attribution and link.





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