Bottom Line Up Front
The past 72 hours showed South Asia being shaped more by forces arriving from outside the subcontinent than by its own quarrels. The US-Iran war, now in its ninth month, reached directly into the region’s labour and energy lifelines when the Panama-flagged LPG tanker MT Tara Gas, crewed largely by 24 Indian seafarers, was struck in the Strait of Hormuz on 16 November, one of at least four tankers reported damaged within a single day. In Islamabad, the 30th Council of Ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization became a platform for Pakistan’s role as a mediator between Washington and Tehran, and the Islamabad Communiqué explicitly commended Pakistani and Qatari mediation. Meanwhile in Manila, the first Quad leaders’ summit in more than two years produced a first joint maritime patrol exercise planned for 2027, a new maritime surveillance initiative and a critical-minerals push, while India used the adjacent ASEAN-India summit to present itself as Southeast Asia’s maritime and digital partner.
Inside the region, the most acute instability risk remains Bangladesh. Crude bombs exploded near Dhaka’s Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport on the night of 16 November, a police station in Tungipara was torched and a BNP leader was killed in Faridpur, all against the backdrop of Sheikh Hasina’s declared intention to return from India in December despite a death sentence in absentia. Pakistan continues to fight on two internal fronts, with the TTP insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa now entangled with illicit gold mining and a Baloch insurgency whose new commander is a former army officer, while the political confrontation with the PTI hardened further. On the India-Pakistan axis, a thin diplomatic thread is visible: Pakistan’s climate minister will attend an SCO dialogue in New Delhi from 20 to 22 November, the first ministerial-level visit in roughly three years. Cyclone Akvan, expected to cross the Andhra Pradesh coast around midday on 20 November as a very severe cyclonic storm, is the principal near-term humanitarian risk.
Our key judgements are as follows. We assess with high confidence that the Hormuz conflict will remain the main external driver of South Asian economic risk through the coming week, transmitted through energy prices, shipping insurance and the safety of South Asian seafarers. We assess with moderate confidence that Bangladesh’s political violence will intensify rather than ease before Hasina’s planned return, with Gopalganj and Dhaka the likeliest flashpoints. We assess with moderate confidence that the Quad’s revival marks a practical rather than rhetorical turn toward maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean and its approaches, with direct relevance for the Malacca and Andaman Sea corridors adjoining Indonesia.
Great-Power Competition and Regional Diplomacy
The diplomatic centre of gravity for South Asia during this window lay in Manila. The Quad leaders, President Donald Trump, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, met on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, and the joint outcome reaffirmed a free and open Indo-Pacific and announced new maritime surveillance and cybersecurity initiatives. The substantive deliverables matter more than the language. The four governments agreed on an Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration and on a first joint maritime exercise in 2027 using P-8 and P-3C patrol aircraft, which Japanese reporting described as the group’s first antisubmarine drill. The statement opposed changes to the status quo by force or coercion, criticised arbitrary export restrictions and committed members to reduce dependence on a single supplier of critical minerals, all without naming China. Indian commentary framed the outcome as a collective pushback against economic coercion, and Trump, standing beside Modi, described the Indian leader as “very tough”, a remark New Delhi will read as a signal that the strains of 2025 over tariffs and Pakistan have been managed rather than resolved.
The timing is significant. Trump is scheduled to meet Xi Jinping in Shenzhen on 19 November, with Albanese expected to see Xi the following day. The Quad has therefore been revived immediately before a US-China summit, which suggests Washington wants leverage rather than confrontation. We judge with moderate confidence that India will treat the Quad’s maritime surveillance component as the most durable outcome, because it fits New Delhi’s preference for capability-building that does not require formal alliance commitments.
The ASEAN-India summit, India’s 23rd with the bloc, gave Modi a stage to frame the partnership as one of “cooperation, not competition”. According to the summit coverage collected by the monitor, he proposed free e-visas, a maritime plan and cyber-forensics cooperation, while the summit adopted a joint statement on disaster management. Vietnam proposed an ASEAN-India maritime dialogue mechanism, and the Philippines sought closer maritime security and trade ties. For Indonesia, President Prabowo Subianto pressed for pharmaceutical, health and disaster-mitigation cooperation and returned to the Sabang-Andaman connectivity agenda first set out in the India-Indonesia partnership for the integrated development of Sabang port in July.
The other notable diplomatic theatre was Islamabad. Pakistan, chairing ECO for 2026-27, hosted the 30th Council of Ministers, which adopted the ECO Strategic Goals 2035 and an Islamabad Communiqué that rejected unilateral sanctions and backed Pakistani and Qatari mediation in the Iran-US crisis. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi used the meeting to call for a “reliable and sustainable regional energy mechanism”, and then met Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, who stressed “sustained engagement” and “mutual trust”. The two sides stressed coordination for regional stability. Pakistan’s military-led diplomacy now spans Washington, Tehran, Riyadh and Ankara simultaneously: Munir also discussed defence cooperation with British and Turkish service chiefs, and Turkish officials said Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will hold joint defence pact talks this month.
SAARC remains dormant, and BIMSTEC did not feature meaningfully in the signal base, which itself reflects the shift of Bay of Bengal diplomacy into ASEAN-India and bilateral channels.
India-Pakistan, Kashmir and Border Security
The India-Pakistan relationship remains frozen at the political level but showed one modest opening. Pakistan has nominated Climate Change Minister Musadik Malik to attend the SCO Civilizational Dialogue in New Delhi from 20 to 22 November, which Indian reporting describes as the first ministerial participation in three years. The choice of Malik is double-edged: Indian media emphasised that he is the minister who once threatened to “cut off those hands” over the Indus Waters Treaty, and the Indian opposition has questioned the government’s decision to host him so soon after the 2025 conflict. Neither side has announced bilateral talks. We judge with moderate confidence that the Delhi visit will pass without a substantive bilateral meeting, and that its value lies in demonstrating that multilateral contact remains possible.
The maritime dimension of the rivalry also resurfaced. India’s Navy Chief, Admiral Krishna Swaminathan, used a media interaction on 16 November to say that the Pakistani ship involved in the September collision with INS Kolkata had manoeuvred unsafely and suffered more damage, and that over 85 percent of Pakistan’s military hardware is Chinese-made. That incident, which raised alarm over unintended escalation when it occurred in the Arabian Sea, remains the clearest example of how the two navies now operate in close proximity without agreed incident-prevention rules.
In Jammu and Kashmir, counter-militancy operations intensified. Security forces in Kulgam reported killing a militant linked to an attack on a CRPF post during an encounter on 16 November, with Indian outlets reporting that a wanted Lashkar-e-Taiba commander was either killed or escaped wounded; the conflicting accounts mean his fate should be treated as unconfirmed. Politically, the killing of special police officers in Kishtwar has become a partisan dispute, with remarks by Congress and BJP figures sparking protests and the Congress alleging the army mistook the officers for militants, a claim that has not been officially substantiated. The broader pattern is of a low-intensity militancy that is numerically smaller than in past decades but more lethal per incident and more politically divisive. We assess with moderate confidence that a mass-casualty attack in the valley in the next 72 hours is unlikely, but that targeted attacks on security personnel and non-local workers remain probable over the winter.
Afghanistan and Transnational Militancy
The Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, made a rare appearance in Kabul at a conference at Kabul University that opened on 16 November. According to Afghanistan International, he offered opponents government posts for the first time, saying that those who had worked with the Americans could return under the amnesty decree and take up positions if they had the skills, while insisting that his decrees were not democratic or a reflection of public opinion. The pro-Taliban Pajhwok agency reported the speech as a call for unity and protection of the Islamic system. Photography was banned and the university was closed for a week. The offer should be read as an attempt to manage an armed opposition that is growing in activity: FDD’s Long War Journal counted 82 claimed anti-Taliban attacks in October, more than double September’s total, with the Afghan United Front claiming 36, mostly in Kandahar and Helmand. These are group claims, not verified figures, but the trend is consistent with The Diplomat’s assessment of the AUF’s emergence. We assess with moderate confidence that the Taliban regime faces no existential military threat, but that insurgent pressure in the Pashtun south is the most significant development in Afghan security since 2021.
The Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship remains defined by mutual accusation. At ECO, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said regional progress requires Afghan authorities to address “the threat of terrorism”, and the Taliban publicly protested their exclusion from the meeting, while the communiqué said Afghanistan’s participation should come “once circumstances permit”. Pakistan’s internal crackdown on Afghan nationals continues, with 796 Afghans arrested in the first week of November.
The most consequential militant signal came from Kohat. After militants ambushed police returning from an operation against illegal gold mining, killing at least ten officers in a clash that also left 18 militants dead and was claimed by the TTP, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa governor suspended all gold mining in the province and cancelled leases, alleging that around 80 percent of illegal mining proceeds, estimated at Rs4.92 billion a month, flowed to Afghanistan to fund terrorism. That figure is a political claim rather than an audited estimate, but the decision connects the TTP insurgency to a resource economy in the same way that analysts have long linked Afghan mineral wealth to the Taliban’s finances. This builds on the escalation described in our previous update on the Kohat ambush.
In Balochistan, The Diplomat reported that a former Pakistani army captain now commands the Baloch Liberation Army, while the BLA claimed that six soldiers had been killed in drone operations, a claim that could not be independently verified. A former army officer at the head of the BLA would suggest improved tactical competence and a deepening of the insurgency’s appeal among educated Baloch, and the group’s turn to drones mirrors a regional diffusion of cheap aerial technology. We assess with high confidence that militant violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan will continue at current or higher levels through the winter, and with moderate confidence that Islamabad will increase pressure on Kabul through border and refugee policy rather than direct cross-border strikes in the immediate term.
Indian Ocean and Maritime Security
The Indian Ocean is no longer insulated from the Gulf war. The attack on MT Tara Gas off Khasab on 16 November produced conflicting official accounts: India’s Ministry of External Affairs said one Indian was missing and two injured, while the Shipping Minister said all 24 Indian seafarers were safe, and the MEA formally condemned the attack. The Iranian Navy said a fourth tanker had struck a naval mine, and UKMTO reported further attacks near Khasab and piracy incidents in the wider Indian Ocean. India’s interest is acute: Indians form one of the largest national groups of seafarers in Gulf shipping, and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka all depend heavily on Gulf energy. The US has kept three carrier strike groups in the region since early October, in what Al Jazeera described as the largest build-up since 2003. One item in the monitor, a report of a US submarine sinking an Iranian warship by torpedo, refers to an incident from March 2026 and is not a new development; we note this because recirculated war reporting is a growing source of false signals.
Admiral Swaminathan’s 16 November remarks also set out India’s maritime posture more clearly than usual, days after the IMNEX-26 exercise with Myanmar and the JAIMEX 2026 exercise with Japan. He said the navy is closely monitoring the growing number of Chinese ships in the Indian Ocean, rejected framing India’s challenges as a one-front or two-front problem, and argued there is “absolutely no doubt” that the Great Nicobar project gives India a strategic advantage near the Malacca Strait. Reporting during the window indicated that India is preparing a major submarine programme, including six Type 214 and three additional Scorpene-class boats, though no final approval has been confirmed.
In Sri Lanka, the cabinet-appointed committee has recommended terminating the US$3.7 billion Sinopec refinery agreement at Hambantota after rejecting ten demands, including a 99-year lease on 700 acres, long tax holidays and up to 40 percent of the domestic fuel market. A final cabinet decision is pending. If confirmed, this would be the most significant setback to a Chinese strategic investment in Sri Lanka since the 2017 Hambantota port lease, and it reflects Colombo’s need to stay within IMF fiscal rules. Nothing in the window altered the status of the Chagos Archipelago or Diego Garcia, though the base’s role in sustaining US operations against Iran makes it a strategic asset of rising importance.
Country Watch
India’s domestic agenda was dominated by preparation for state elections and contested electoral roll revisions. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the opposition INDIA bloc’s questions on the nationwide Special Intensive Revision, while the BJP launched a booth-level outreach campaign in Uttar Pradesh.
Pakistan’s political confrontation sharpened. Imran Khan, in an open letter to the chief justices of the Federal Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and Islamabad High Court, said he could prove his innocence only “if I stay alive” and pleaded for medical treatment for himself and his wife; eight Pakistan Bar Council members backed the plea. On 17 November, police detained former Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ministers Taimur Jhagra and Kamran Bangash and PTI Peshawar president Irfan Saleem under public order provisions despite interim bail from the Peshawar High Court. We assess with high confidence that the government will continue to use preventive detention against the PTI, and with moderate confidence that Khan’s health will become the main mobilising issue for his supporters in coming weeks.
Bangladesh is the country to watch most closely. Two crude bombs exploded near Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport on the night of 16 November, injuring three pedestrians; police said they had not established any link to Hasina, but security has been tightened, with about 2,000 police and ten Border Guard Bangladesh platoons deployed in Gopalganj. ANI reported that a BNP leader was killed in Faridpur and the Tungipara police station torched, and violent protests erupted in Hasina’s hometown. This follows a wave in which, according to Bangladeshi reporting cited by NewsBytes, 19 buses were burned and explosions occurred at 27 locations between 7 and 9 November. The Home Minister said the Awami League can no longer engage in democratic politics, while NCP leader Hasnat Abdullah alleged that India is using the Awami League and its student wing to wage a “proxy war”. Bangladesh has refused Hasina a passport and seeks her extradition; India has not decided. A prime ministerial adviser said India cannot dictate terms on her return, and the government rejected reports of Indian conditions. Overlaying this, garment workers again blocked highways and clashed with police in their campaign to raise the minimum wage from Tk12,500 to Tk30,000, even though the wage board has promised new scales from January. We assess with moderate confidence that Bangladesh is entering its most dangerous political period since the February 2026 election, and that the overlap of labour unrest and partisan violence will be exploited by all sides.
Sri Lanka’s government secured FBI assistance in investigating online scam centres targeting Americans, an issue that links Sri Lanka to the Southeast Asian scam economy. Nepal’s Prime Minister Balendra Shah, whose Rastriya Swatantra Party won a landslide in March, will make his first India visit on 22 November, now cut from three days to 25 hours, with fertiliser, seed and connectivity on the agenda. The shortened visit, together with former Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli telling cadres to prepare for protests “at any time”, suggests a government cautious about appearing too close to New Delhi and an opposition looking for an issue.
Bhutan won an Earthshot Prize at the Mumbai ceremony for its conservation work, while External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, and Adani Power listed Bhutan projects in its expansion roadmap, reinforcing Thimphu’s economic integration with India. The Maldives produced no significant strategic signal in the window. Afghanistan, beyond the security developments above, saw OCHA approve US$18 million in aid for 824,000 vulnerable people, while reports of a new crackdown on women’s access to medical care highlighted the continuing humanitarian cost of Taliban rule.
Economy, Energy, Trade and Markets
The war in the Gulf is the dominant macroeconomic factor for the region. Pakistan’s central bank said it would revise its inflation forecast as the Middle East war raises energy costs, even though it still expects inflation to return to its 5-7 percent target range during FY2027. Islamabad cut petrol prices by Rs3 per litre while leaving diesel unchanged, and industrial consumers protested a proposed Rs24 billion quarterly tariff adjustment. The most striking energy development was the agreement under which Saudi Arabia’s Delta Energy will evaluate a roughly US$30 billion energy infrastructure programme in Pakistan, including a pipeline from the west toward Gwadar and another from Chaman on the Afghan border toward the Indian border near Fazilka, using gas from Afghanistan’s Kashk concession. This is a framework to evaluate projects, not an investment decision, and the India-facing pipeline is politically implausible in present conditions. Its significance is that Gulf capital is again exploring Afghan resources as a regional energy source, alongside renewed Pakistani-Turkmen steering talks on the TAPI pipeline.
Bangladesh connected its first nuclear power plant, at Rooppur, to the national grid, a milestone for a Russian-built project that ties Dhaka to Rosatom for decades, while the Asian Development Bank committed to help develop 1,000 MW of solar and battery capacity.
Currency movements in the latest reading, expressed per US dollar from ExchangeRate-API, were generally calm. The Indian rupee stood at 93.96, firming 0.47 percent against the previous day, and the Bhutanese ngultrum tracked it at 93.96. The Pakistani rupee was 276.56, the Bangladeshi taka 124.59, the Sri Lankan rupee 332.68 and the Nepalese rupee 150.34, the latter firming 0.46 percent with the Indian rupee. The Maldivian rufiyaa was 15.43 and the Afghan afghani 65.37, the afghani weakening 0.69 percent, the largest daily move among the regional currencies. The Indonesian rupiah was 18,273 per dollar, weakening 0.28 percent.
Nikkei Asia reported that El Niño is lifting crop prices across India and Southeast Asia, a reminder that the climate and energy shocks are reinforcing each other. We assess with moderate confidence that food inflation, rather than fuel, will become the main political risk in importing economies by early 2027 if El Niño conditions persist.
Disasters, Climate and Environmental Risk
Cyclone Akvan is the immediate hazard. The India Meteorological Department’s 17 November bulletins placed the storm about 670 km south-southeast of Visakhapatnam, moving slowly north-northwest, and forecast it to intensify into a very severe cyclonic storm and cross the Andhra Pradesh and Yanam coast between Nellore and Tuni around noon on 20 November, with winds of 120 to 130 km/h gusting to 145 km/h, a storm surge of one to two metres in low-lying districts and isolated rainfall above 21 cm. An orange alert covers Andhra Pradesh and south Odisha, and GDACS issued an orange notification, with 15.37 million people potentially exposed to tropical-storm-force winds. Akvan is the third cyclone to threaten India’s east coast within a month, after Arnab and Murasu, and Prakasam’s tobacco farmers, already hit twice, now fear a third blow. Indian experts attribute the rare triple-cyclone sequence to El Niño.
Elsewhere, Pakistan issued a drought alert for four districts in southern Sindh, a warning that links directly to the water rhetoric over the Indus. Afghanistan recorded two intermediate-depth earthquakes in the Hindu Kush on 16 November, a magnitude 5.0 event 74 km north of Pārūn and a magnitude 4.9 event 44 km south of Jurm, with no damage reported, plus a smaller tremor on the Tajik border. Nepal’s recovery from the catastrophic glacial-collapse floods of August, which left hundreds missing on both sides of the Nepal-Tibet border, remains slow: displaced families have settled on Nepal Electricity Authority land, and Nepali youth used the COP31 process to press for grants to rebuild. We assess with high confidence that climate finance will be a growing point of South Asian friction with developed economies, and that loans-based adaptation will face more open political resistance.
Implications for Southeast Asia and Indonesia
Three implications stand out for Southeast Asia and Indonesia. First, the Hormuz crisis is now a shared Indian Ocean problem. Indonesia, like India, depends on Gulf energy and supplies large numbers of seafarers to global shipping, and the attack on MT Tara Gas shows that crews from labour-exporting countries are the first to absorb the war’s human cost. Jakarta has an interest in joining India and Japan in pressing for safe transit corridors and for arrangements that protect non-combatant crews. The ECO communiqué’s call for a regional energy mechanism and the Quad’s emphasis on supply chain resilience point in the same direction, and ASEAN has an opportunity to develop its own collective position.
Second, the Quad’s new maritime surveillance initiative and planned patrol aircraft exercise will be conducted near Indonesia’s western approaches. India’s Navy Chief explicitly linked the Great Nicobar project to a strategic advantage near the Malacca Strait, and India’s ASEAN agenda includes coordinated patrols in the Strait. For Indonesia, this raises the importance of the Sabang-Andaman link that Prabowo has championed: Sabang can be a channel through which Indonesia shapes Indian maritime activity in the Andaman Sea on terms consistent with its free and active foreign policy, rather than a passive object of great-power competition. Aceh, with its ports and proximity to the Andamans, has a direct stake in how this develops.
Third, the scam economy and political violence in Bangladesh have regional spillover. The FBI’s work in Sri Lanka and India’s pledge with the US, China, Russia and ASEAN to coordinate against online scams show that South Asian law enforcement is joining a problem centred on mainland Southeast Asia. Instability in Bangladesh could also renew pressure on Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar and increase irregular maritime movement toward Aceh and Malaysia, a pattern seen in previous crises. We assess with moderate confidence that a sharp deterioration in Bangladesh over December would produce increased boat departures in the following dry season, and that Indonesian authorities should plan for this possibility.
Indicators and Warnings for the Next 72 Hours
On the Gulf front, the key signposts are further attacks on merchant ships near Khasab or in the Gulf of Oman, any confirmation of the missing Indian seafarer’s fate, and whether the Trump-Xi meeting in Shenzhen on 19 November produces any language on Iran or the Strait. A new round of Pakistani-hosted Iran-US talks would be a significant de-escalatory signal. In Sri Lanka, a formal cabinet decision on the Sinopec refinery would be a notable strategic signal, and the Nepali Prime Minister’s 22 November visit to New Delhi will test Kathmandu’s balance. A sustained rise in Brent prices or war-risk insurance premiums would quickly pass through to South Asian fuel and power prices.
In Bangladesh, warning signs would include more crude bomb attacks in Dhaka, arson against trains or banks, deaths in Gopalganj, a formal blockade or hartal call by the banned Awami League or its student wing, and any Indian statement on Hasina’s extradition or travel. A garment sector strike that closes factories in Gazipur and Ashulia would deepen the economic cost and indicate that labour and partisan unrest are converging.
In Pakistan, indicators include the court response to Imran Khan’s letter, any further detentions of PTI figures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, new TTP attacks on police or mining operations around Kohat, and BLA claims of drone or highway attacks. On India-Pakistan, the arrival of Musadik Malik in New Delhi for the 20 to 22 November SCO event, and whether any informal meeting occurs, will be the main diplomatic signal, while new encounters in Kulgam or attacks on security forces in Jammu would indicate rising militant activity before winter.
For Afghanistan, observers should watch for further claims by the Afghan United Front and other resistance groups in Kandahar and Helmand, Taliban responses to Akhundzada’s amnesty offer and any returns by former officials, and Pakistani measures against Afghan migrants. On the natural hazard front, the IMD’s narrowing of Akvan’s landfall point, evacuation orders in Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, and storm surge impacts in Krishna, Bapatla and West Godavari districts on 20 November will determine whether this becomes a major humanitarian event.
Method and Sources
This update covers the 72-hour window from 05:41 WIB on 15 November to 05:41 WIB on 18 November 2026. It draws on 3,000 signals from 813 sources collected by the KBA13 South Asia and Indian Ocean Intelligence Monitor, whose retained store for this run covered mainly the period from mid-afternoon on 16 November, supplemented by targeted web verification of the leading developments against publisher reporting. State-aligned and partisan claims, including militant claims of casualties, are identified as such. Currency data are per US dollar from ExchangeRate-API, earthquake data are from USGS and media tone data are from GDELT, where Afghanistan (minus 2.5) and Pakistan (minus 1.62) registered the most negative tone of the eight countries monitored.
About The Author
- Series · Seri
- KBA13 Insight Update, South Asia & Indian Ocean Edition
- Volume · Number
- Vol. 2, No. 59 (November 2026)
- Cumulative issue · Edisi ke-
- 71
- Reference · Nomor rujukan
KBA13-IU-2026-02-059- Author · Penulis
- KBA13 Insight Research Team
- Published · Terbit
- 18 November 2026
- Section · Rubrik
- KBA13 Insight Update, KBA13 Insight Update International
- Keywords · Kata kunci
- Bangladesh, Indian Ocean, Pakistan, Quad, South Asia, Strait of Hormuz
- Language · Bahasa
- English
- Length · Panjang
- 4,251 words · ±19 min read
- Publisher · Penerbit
- KBA13 Insight, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
- Permalink
- www.kba13.com/kba13-insight-update-2026-11-18-south-asia/
- How to cite · Cara mengutip
- KBA13 Insight Research Team. (2026, November 18). KBA13 Insight Update – 18 November 2026: South Asia & Indian Ocean – Hormuz Spillover Hits Indian Crews as Quad Revives in Manila. KBA13 Insight Update, 2(59). https://www.kba13.com/kba13-insight-update-2026-11-18-south-asia/
- Rights · Hak cipta
- © 2026 KBA13 Insight. Quotation permitted with full attribution and link.







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