KBA13 Insight Update – 12 November 2026: South Asia & Indian Ocean – Kohat Ambush Signals TTP Escalation as Bangladesh Braces for Hasina’s December Return

Bottom Line Up Front

The defining development of the past 72 hours is the convergence of two distinct but mutually reinforcing pressures on South Asian stability: a sharp escalation of Pakistani Taliban (TTP) violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, crystallised by the Kohat ambush of 11 November that killed at least ten police officers, and a deliberate campaign of arson and crude-bomb attacks in Bangladesh that police attribute to the banned Awami League ahead of Sheikh Hasina’s declared intention to return from India in December. Neither crisis is new, yet both have moved from a slow burn to an operational tempo that will shape the region’s security calendar through the end of the year. Behind them, the wider Gulf war continues to set the terms of South Asia’s economic and maritime exposure: a Liberia-flagged supertanker carrying six Indian seafarers was struck in the Persian Gulf on 10 November, while Pakistan’s near-daily fuel price revisions and Sri Lanka’s tea-sector distress show how directly the conflict now feeds into household and fiscal stress across the subcontinent. We judge with high confidence that militant pressure on Pakistan’s northwest will persist and probably intensify over the coming weeks, that Bangladesh faces the most dangerous political December since the 2024 uprising, and that India will keep using naval diplomacy and mediation offers, from the Arabian Sea to the Black Sea, to position itself as the indispensable stabiliser of the Indian Ocean. We judge with moderate confidence that the Dhaka–Islamabad rapprochement, visible in intelligence and leadership contacts this week, will continue to complicate India’s eastern neighbourhood policy.

Great-Power Competition and Regional Diplomacy

India’s diplomacy this window was notably outward-facing and calibrated to the Gulf and Eurasian wars rather than to its immediate neighbourhood. As trilateral US–Ukraine–Russia talks opened in Abu Dhabi, New Delhi publicly pressed for a rapid end to the war and for safe commercial navigation in the Black Sea, as The Indian Express reported, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said India was ready to help mediate Black Sea food corridors after talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, according to Nation Path India. In parallel, India has continued to insist on unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz amid repeated attacks on merchant shipping, as India Today reported, and pledged support for an Indian ship captain detained in the United Kingdom over Russian oil sanctions, a case documented by Marine Insight. We assess with moderate confidence that India’s mediation offers are primarily positional, designed to protect its strategic autonomy and its discounted Russian energy supply, rather than a prelude to a substantive brokering role.

With Europe, India’s Foreign Secretary held dialogues in Paris on economic security, space and critical technologies, which The Hindu framed as a deepening of supply-chain cooperation, while trade talks with Canada advanced toward a proposed pact, also reported by The Hindu. A US court has allowed Khalistani separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun to serve India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and a former intelligence chief in his civil suit, which New Delhi rejected as “fabricated” and “malicious”, according to The Hindu. This legal track will remain an irritant in India–US relations regardless of the warmth of trade and counter-narcotics cooperation.

Pakistan’s diplomacy, by contrast, has been dense and multidirectional. At COP31 in Antalya, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa and senior Saudi officials, as Dawn detailed. Washington has nominated career diplomat Natalie Baker as ambassador to Islamabad, per Dawn, and the United Kingdom’s Security Minister visited to expand counter-terrorism cooperation, according to GOV.UK. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s military told Asharq Al-Awsat that its commitment to Saudi security is “non-negotiable”, a signal that the Saudi–Türkiye–Pakistan defence alignment discussed across regional media this week is acquiring operational meaning. China’s role remains structural rather than headline-driven: the Karakoram-2026 joint army exercise, the first of its kind between the two armies, was reported by The Express Tribune in October and was revisited this week by The Indian Express as evidence of deepening interoperability. India’s reported decision to raise specialist police commando units for the China frontier, noted by the South China Morning Post, is the mirror image of that trend. We assess with high confidence that Pakistan is successfully diversifying its strategic patrons across Washington, Riyadh, Ankara and Beijing, which reduces India’s leverage to isolate it diplomatically.

Regional institutions showed modest life. Sri Lanka chaired the first BIMSTEC Health Ministers’ Meeting in Colombo, where India offered to share healthcare expertise, as DD India reported. SAARC remains dormant, and BIMSTEC’s functional agenda continues to be the principal vehicle for India-led regionalism around the Bay of Bengal.

India–Pakistan, Kashmir and Border Security

The Line of Control was quiet in kinetic terms, but the Kashmir Valley registered a renewed militant signature. On 11 November, two gunmen emerged from a forested patch near Mir Bazar in Kulgam and opened fire on a Central Reserve Police Force checkpost about a kilometre from the Jammu–Srinagar highway, wounding three personnel before escaping on foot, according to Millennium Post; security agencies reportedly suspect a local Lashkar-e-Taiba commander, though no official attribution has been confirmed. The same day, two Special Police Officers were reported missing after a firing incident in Kishtwar, according to The Indian Express. The Kulgam attack coincided with a visit by Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha to the district and drew criticism of the security strategy from National Conference leader Farooq Abdullah, indicating that the political management of security in the Union Territory remains contested between the elected government and Raj Bhavan.

Diplomatically, India used the FATF plenary in Paris (28–30 October) to flag what it called Pakistan’s “backsliding” on counter-terror financing obligations, particularly unverifiable action against Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar, according to WION. The plenary took no formal decision on Pakistan, and FATF President Giles Thomson noted that Pakistan will next be evaluated by the Asia/Pacific Group “in a few years’ time”. India’s campaign is therefore a long game of reputational pressure rather than an imminent grey-listing. Indian outlets also reported that Pakistan has installed around 50 anti-drone units along the LoC, mostly in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, a claim carried by Bhaskar English that we have not been able to verify independently and treat as indicative only.

We judge with moderate confidence that the probability of a major India–Pakistan military crisis in the next 72 hours is low, because both militaries are absorbed elsewhere, Pakistan by its western front and India by its maritime and China commitments. The principal risk vector is a mass-casualty attack in Jammu and Kashmir that New Delhi attributes to Pakistan-based groups; the Kulgam incident is a reminder that militant capacity in south Kashmir has not been extinguished, and the planned BJP rally in Srinagar on 15 November, reported by Only Kashmir, is a plausible target window for spoilers.

Afghanistan and Transnational Militancy

The Kohat ambush is the most consequential security event of the window. Militants ambushed police vehicles returning from an operation against illegal gold mining near Kohat on 11 November, triggering an hours-long gunbattle in which at least ten officers, including two senior officers, and 18 militants were killed, according to AP via Arab News; Pakistani outlets such as The Pakistan Times put the police toll at eleven, including a deputy superintendent. The TTP claimed responsibility, while Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police alleged collusion between militants and criminal networks “at the behest of foreign powers”, without offering evidence. The attack followed a raid on a police post in neighbouring Hangu on the night of 9 November in which one constable was killed and three abducted, as The Express Tribune reported, and the abduction of three polio workers in the northwest reported by The Hindu. The cumulative picture is of a militant movement that can mass fighters, sustain firefights and target the state’s softest enforcement layer, the provincial police, across several districts in a single week.

The cross-border dimension is hardening. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police announced the arrest in Tirah of a former Afghan National Army soldier from Paktia, who they say joined the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group and confessed to attacks, according to Dawn; these remain official allegations. The same report recalls Pakistan’s “calibrated” airstrikes of 21 September and Operation Ghazab lil Haq, launched on 26 February after cross-border fire by the Afghan Taliban, which places this week’s violence inside a year-long confrontation that Iranian commentary now openly describes as a war Tehran hopes to contain, as Amwaj.media put it. Islamabad’s insistence that threats emanating from Afghanistan remain a core concern, reported by Amu TV, signals no softening.

Kabul, meanwhile, is cultivating Moscow, which gives it diplomatic depth precisely as Pakistan’s pressure rises. Russia’s special envoy Zamir Kabulov met Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi on trade and counter-narcotics, according to Afghanistan International; Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani also received the Russian envoy, per 8am Media, and Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk is expected in Kabul for economic talks, per Afghanistan International. President Vladimir Putin said, as reported by The Kabul Tribune, that the CSTO is closely monitoring Afghanistan’s security situation. We judge with high confidence that TTP violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will continue at or above current levels through the winter, and with moderate confidence that Pakistan will conduct further cross-border strikes if a mass-casualty attack on soldiers or civilians occurs. The humanitarian backdrop remains grim, with UNICEF Australia warning of worsening malnutrition and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect listing Afghanistan in its latest atrocity alert.

Indian Ocean and Maritime Security

The Gulf war’s maritime front has become the principal external stressor on South Asian shipping. On 10 November the Liberia-flagged VLCC Fujairah Energy, sailing from Al Ruwais to Dubai, was hit by a projectile in the Persian Gulf, injuring four crew including one of six Indian seafarers aboard, according to Marine Insight, which also cites International Maritime Organization figures of 25 seafarer deaths and at least 130 verified attacks on commercial vessels since the conflict began on 28 February, with 37 attacks in October alone. India’s shipping minister Sarbananda Sonowal confirmed the Indian crew presence, as The Hindu reported. The attacker was not identified. For South Asia, which supplies a disproportionate share of the world’s merchant seafarers, the human exposure is as significant as the energy exposure; India’s foreign ministry had counted 15 seafarers among 23 Indian nationals lost in the conflict as of 3 November. Further south, the EU naval force has tracked a rise in piracy between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, as Yahoo News Canada reported, a by-product of naval assets being diverted to the Gulf.

India’s response has been to increase naval presence and partnerships at a pace that raises questions of sustainability. INS Surat arrived in Muscat for the 15th India–Oman exercise Naseem Al Bahr, reported by News On AIR, while INS Tarkash is set to join IBSAMAR IX with Brazil and South Africa, according to the Press Information Bureau. On 2 November the Ministry of Defence signed contracts worth ₹53,866.5 crore with GRSE and Goa Shipyard for eight Project 28A next-generation corvettes, as Naval News reported. The South China Morning Post noted that the Indian Navy has conducted eleven drills in sixty days, raising the question whether it is stretched too thin. We assess with moderate confidence that India’s operational tempo is sustainable in the short term but that the gap between ambition and hull numbers will widen until new platforms enter service later in the decade.

In the Bay of Bengal, competition for coastal security capacity is intensifying. Japan signed a ¥1 billion (about Rs 2.08 billion) Official Security Assistance grant on 10 November for 25 rigid-hull inflatable boats for the Sri Lanka Navy, to be deployed across all five naval commands, according to the Daily FT; Tamil advocacy outlets such as the Tamil Guardian objected to deployment in the north and east given the Navy’s rights record. Bangladesh, for its part, will receive 38 additional Defiant-class patrol boats from US builder Metal Shark, reported by Naval Today, is expanding coastal surveillance with drones and fast vessels, and is exploring defence cooperation with the Maldives, according to The Business Standard. Construction has also begun on the Mongla Port expansion, per India Shipping News. The Chagos–Diego Garcia file produced no significant new signal in this window. We judge with high confidence that Japan and the United States are now the most active external providers of low-end maritime capacity in the Bay of Bengal, a trend that complements India’s role but also gives littoral states options outside New Delhi’s orbit.

Country Watch

Pakistan. Beyond the northwest, Pakistan’s internal politics remain locked around Imran Khan’s imprisonment. Following Islamabad High Court orders, PTI lawyers met Khan and Bushra Bibi at Adiala jail for about three hours, according to Dawn, after he was briefly taken to PIMS for an eye procedure. A Peshawar anti-terrorism court reissued an arrest warrant for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Sohail Afridi in the Radio Pakistan attack case, per Dawn, sustaining friction between the federal government and the PTI-led province that is fighting the TTP. Positively, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif presided over the dome placement at the Chinese-backed Chashma-5 nuclear plant, which will add 1,200 MW, as The Express Tribune reported.

Bangladesh. The political temperature is rising faster than anywhere else in the region. Between 8 and 10 November, at least 19 buses were torched and more than 50 crude-bomb explosions were recorded in Dhaka, with a bus driver killed in Faridpur, according to The Business Standard; police blame the banned Awami League and Chhatra League, have arrested hundreds and deployed 15,000 additional personnel in the capital. Sheikh Hasina, sentenced to death in absentia in November 2025, has requested a new passport and says she will return in December to surrender before a court, per Al Jazeera; the chief prosecutor said the sentence would be enforced on her return, as Dawn reported, and the government has rejected the passport request. India, which has declined Dhaka’s extradition request, noted that a travel document would be needed, according to The Hindu, while six UK parliamentarians urged safeguards against her execution, per The Times of India. Asia Times rightly describes December, the first Victory Month under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s BNP government and the anniversary of last year’s mob attacks on media houses, as a month of converging crises. Externally, Rahman met President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Antalya to discuss defence cooperation, reported by ANI, and Bangladesh’s intelligence chief travelled to Pakistan days after an India visit, according to The Daily Jagran. The home minister also called the Rohingya presence a major economic burden, per New Age, and said 316 people had been killed in armed attacks in the Chittagong Hill Tracts over five years, as reported by the Daily Sun. We judge with high confidence that political violence will escalate if Hasina announces a firm return date, and with moderate confidence that she will ultimately not travel in December, because neither New Delhi nor her party leadership is likely to accept the risk of her arrest and execution.

India. Domestic security news was dominated by Kashmir and by the run-up to the DGP–IGP conference in Tirupati from 4 December, reported by The Hindu. Air pollution after Diwali overwhelmed monitors in the north, as The Straits Times reported, and became politically contentious. Economic policy was activist: the cabinet cleared a fertiliser subsidy of about $6.65 billion for the winter season, according to Reuters, and barred exports of lithium-ion battery waste containing black mass, per The Hindu, a critical-minerals move with implications for regional recycling chains. Indian reports of Chinese vloggers passing off Dhaka scenes as Delhi, carried by The Times of India, illustrate how information competition with China is increasingly framed as a security issue.

Sri Lanka. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reviewed final 2027 budget proposals ahead of presentation, per EconomyNext. The government’s counter-terrorism bill continues to draw criticism, with the UN rights office urging a substantive redraft, according to the Daily FT, and the Jaffna bishop joining calls to scrap the security bills, per the Tamil Guardian. Colombo also courted Indian investment in Port City, reported by The Island, while the Gulf war has plunged the tea industry into crisis, as DW reported.

Maldives. President Mohamed Muizzu reaffirmed that Israeli passport holders will not be allowed entry “under any circumstances”, with a draft immigration bill removing the earlier condition linking the ban to the Gaza war, according to Anadolu Agency.

Nepal and Bhutan. Nepal’s government under Prime Minister Balendra Shah used COP31 to press for loss-and-damage finance after the catastrophic Nepal–Tibet floods of late August, whose death toll had risen to 1,295 by early September, according to Business Standard. Yet Foreign Minister Khanal acknowledged that the Himalayan agenda was left off the formal COP31 list because major blocs withheld support, as The Hindu reported. Bhutan registered little, though The Diplomat highlighted China’s gradual encroachment on India’s economic dominance in Bhutan, a slow-moving but strategically meaningful trend.

Afghanistan. Covered above; the Taliban’s Russian engagement and the confrontation with Pakistan are the decisive variables, while a moderate magnitude 4.0 earthquake south of Fayzabad in Badakhshan on 11 November, logged by VolcanoDiscovery, caused no reported damage.

Economy, Energy, Trade and Markets

Currency markets were broadly stable over the window, a sign that the Gulf war’s financial shock has been absorbed even as its real-economy effects linger. Per US dollar, according to ExchangeRate-API data compiled by the monitor, the Indian rupee stood at 93.96 (up 0.03 percent against the dollar’s prior-day level), the Pakistani rupee at 276.95 (0.15 percent), the Bangladeshi taka at 124.61 (0.28 percent, the largest daily move in the region), the Sri Lankan rupee at 332.25 (0.09 percent stronger), the Nepali rupee at 150.32, the Bhutanese ngultrum at 93.95, the Maldivian rufiyaa at 15.46 (0.13 percent) and the Afghan afghani at 65.11, while the Indonesian rupiah traded at 18,089.50. The taka’s slippage is consistent with Daily Star reporting of a rising dollar rate and with political risk ahead of December; Bangladesh Bank’s easing of import credit terms before Ramadan will add modest pressure. The Sri Lankan rupee’s stability around 332, reported by EconomyNext, reflects disciplined monetary management under the IMF programme.

Energy pricing is the main transmission channel. Pakistan cut high-speed diesel by Rs7 to Rs364 per litre and petrol by Rs3 to Rs335 effective 12 November, according to Dawn, which notes that prices have been revised almost daily since renewed Iran–US hostilities on 17 July and peaked in April at Rs520.35 for diesel. The Asian Development Bank announced $500 million in contingent disaster financing for Pakistan, as The Express Tribune reported, while Sharif’s claim at COP31 that Pakistan added nearly 22 GW of rooftop solar in two years points to a decentralised energy transition that is eroding grid revenues even as it improves resilience. In Bangladesh, a study reported by Bonik Barta estimated that a delayed energy transition costs nearly $3 billion a year.

On trade, India’s textile and garment exporters are rethinking dependence on the US market after tariff shocks, according to Reuters via Dawn, while a trade dispute with the United Kingdom has seen Scotch whisky impounded, per The Telegraph. These frictions sit uneasily with India’s ambition, voiced by Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal according to ET Government, to reach $1 trillion in exports this fiscal year. We judge with moderate confidence that South Asian currencies will remain stable through the next 72 hours absent a new Gulf escalation, and that Pakistan’s fuel prices will continue to track Brent closely given the daily pricing mechanism.

Disasters, Climate and Environmental Risk

The near-term hazard is meteorological. The India Meteorological Department’s extended-range outlook anticipated a cyclonic circulation over the southeast Bay of Bengal around 11 November, consolidating into a low-pressure area around 13 November, with a low probability of intensification into a depression over the southwest Bay around 15 November, according to Business News Week. Sri Lankan forecasters warned that the disturbance could severely affect the island, reported by the Daily Mirror. We judge with moderate confidence that heavy rainfall will affect Tamil Nadu, Puducherry and northern and eastern Sri Lanka in the week of 16 November, but with low confidence on cyclone formation.

Air pollution has become a cross-border security and political issue. Post-Diwali smog overwhelmed monitoring equipment in north India, and the second Pakistan–Sri Lanka cricket Test was moved from Lahore to Rawalpindi because of smog, as Dawn reported. At COP31, the absence of top leaders from the United States and several G7 states, and the exclusion of the Himalayan agenda, underscored how little external climate finance the region can expect. The monitor recorded no significant USGS earthquakes in the window, and GDACS reported only a low-level forest fire alert in India.

Implications for Southeast Asia and Indonesia

Three implications stand out for Southeast Asia and Indonesia. First, the Gulf war’s maritime insecurity is a direct concern for Jakarta and its ASEAN partners, both as energy importers and as major suppliers of seafarers. Indonesia, like India, has nationals aboard vessels transiting Hormuz and the Red Sea, and the Indian model of combining naval escort, crew welfare diplomacy and public insistence on freedom of navigation offers a template that Jakarta could adapt through its own maritime diplomacy, including with Oman and the Gulf states.

Second, the hardening of the Saudi–Türkiye–Pakistan security alignment and the deepening China–Pakistan military integration are reshaping the Muslim-majority security landscape in ways that Indonesia, as the largest Muslim-majority democracy and a non-aligned actor, must read carefully. Bangladesh’s simultaneous outreach to Türkiye and Pakistan, and its drift away from India, creates a new strategic configuration on the western edge of Southeast Asia’s Bay of Bengal flank. For Indonesia and ASEAN, a more volatile Bangladesh also has a humanitarian dimension: Rohingya movement across the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea will likely increase if Dhaka’s political crisis deepens and Myanmar’s Rakhine conflict persists, with Aceh’s coast once again a plausible landing zone.

Third, Japan’s expanding Official Security Assistance to Sri Lanka and the US supply of patrol craft to Bangladesh demonstrate how external powers are building low-end maritime capacity in the Indian Ocean littoral. Indonesia has been a recipient of similar Japanese support, and the convergence suggests an emerging Japan-led network of coast-guard and naval capacity stretching from the Bay of Bengal to the Malacca Strait. Indonesia’s interest lies in shaping that network through ASEAN and IORA mechanisms so that it reinforces regional autonomy rather than great-power blocs. We assess with moderate confidence that Bay of Bengal security will feature more prominently in ASEAN–India and ASEAN–Japan dialogues over the coming year.

Indicators and Warnings for the Next 72 Hours

In Pakistan’s northwest, the key signposts are further TTP attacks on police in Kohat, Hangu, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Khyber, any attack on military convoys or cantonments, and official statements naming Afghan territory as the launch point; a Pakistani airstrike inside Afghanistan or a public warning to Kabul from the military’s media wing would indicate escalation. The fate of the three abducted Hangu policemen and the three polio workers will also test the state’s reach. In Kashmir, watch for follow-on attacks in Kulgam, Shopian and Kishtwar, the outcome of the search for the missing Special Police Officers, and security arrangements around the BJP rally planned for Srinagar on 15 November.

In Bangladesh, the decisive indicator is whether Sheikh Hasina or her aides announce a firm return date, and whether India issues any travel document. Renewed shutdown calls by the Chhatra League, crude-bomb incidents in Dhaka, attacks on BNP offices, and mass arrests in Gopalganj or Cumilla would signal intensification. Government statements on the extradition treaty and any Indian response will frame the bilateral temperature. Further Bangladesh–Pakistan or Bangladesh–Türkiye defence announcements would confirm the strategic drift we identify.

At sea, monitor additional attacks on tankers in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, especially any involving South Asian crews, and new Indian Navy deployments or escort announcements. In the Bay of Bengal, watch IMD and Sri Lanka Department of Meteorology bulletins around 13 to 15 November for the formation of a low-pressure area or depression. In markets, a taka move beyond 125 per dollar, or a reversal of Pakistan’s fuel price cuts, would be early signs of renewed stress. Diplomatically, watch the Overchuk visit to Kabul, the conclusion of COP31 negotiations on loss-and-damage finance, and the next steps in the Abu Dhabi talks where India seeks a role on Black Sea corridors.

Method and Sources

This update covers the 72 hours from 05:46 WIB on 9 November to 05:46 WIB on 12 November 2026. It draws on 3,000 signals from 754 sources aggregated by the KBA13 South Asia & Indian Ocean Intelligence Monitor, with key facts checked against original publisher reporting and, where possible, at least two independent sources; statements by governments, security forces and partisan outlets are reported as claims. GDELT media tone over the window was most negative for India (−0.92) and Bangladesh (−0.44) and positive only for Bhutan (+0.22) and the Maldives (+0.60). It builds on the previous edition, Internal Security Becomes South Asia’s Primary Instrument of Statecraft.

About The Author

Article Identity · Identitas ArtikelDownload PDF

Series · Seri

KBA13 Insight Update, South Asia & Indian Ocean Edition

Volume · Number

Vol. 2, No. 45 (November 2026)

Cumulative issue · Edisi ke-

57

Reference · Nomor rujukan

KBA13-IU-2026-02-045

Author · Penulis

KBA13 Insight Research Team

Published · Terbit

12 November 2026

Section · Rubrik

KBA13 Insight Update, KBA13 Insight Update International

Keywords · Kata kunci

Bangladesh, Indian Ocean, Kashmir, Pakistan, South Asia, Strait of Hormuz, Taliban Pakistan

Language · Bahasa

English

Length · Panjang

4,113 words · ±19 min read

Publisher · Penerbit

KBA13 Insight, Banda Aceh, Indonesia

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How to cite · Cara mengutip

KBA13 Insight Research Team. (2026, November 12). KBA13 Insight Update – 12 November 2026: South Asia & Indian Ocean – Kohat Ambush Signals TTP Escalation as Bangladesh Braces for Hasina’s December Return. KBA13 Insight Update, 2(45). https://www.kba13.com/kba13-insight-update-2026-11-12-south-asia/

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