KBA13 Insight Update – 12 November 2026: Africa – Ethiopia Accuses Eritrea and Sudan as Kinshasa Signs Its Referendum Law

Bottom Line Up Front

The 72 hours to midday on 12 November confirmed that Africa’s most dangerous crises are now crises of contested legitimacy as much as of armed violence, and that the two are feeding each other. In the Horn, Addis Ababa moved from diplomatic signalling to formal accusation: Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Horn of Africa adviser, Getachew Reda, told the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy for the Horn that Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki and Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan are arming and coordinating armed groups inside Ethiopia and conducting drone attacks on its territory, an allegation reported by Addis Standard via allAfrica and not independently verified. The G7 has warned of regional escalation, and at least 65 people were reported killed in an armed assault in Benishangul-Gumuz near the Sudanese border. In Central Africa, President Félix Tshisekedi signed the law that sets the procedure for a new constitution and a referendum, according to Reuters, opening the legal path that critics say leads to a third term while the east remains at war and the Ebola epidemic has passed 11,000 confirmed cases. In Somalia, a Supreme Court ruling that the president’s mandate has expired has collided with the dismissal of the chief justice and allegations that security forces have taken control of the court, even as Mogadishu, the opposition and the security chiefs agreed on broad principles for elections and counter-terrorism.

Our first key judgement is that the probability of direct interstate hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the coming months has risen, and that Sudan is now a co-belligerent in the narrative of both sides rather than a bystander (moderate confidence). The second is that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is entering a period in which constitutional manoeuvring, a collapsing military discipline regime and an uncontrolled Ebola outbreak will compound one another, making the east less governable and Kinshasa more brittle through 2027 (high confidence). The third is that the Sahel’s security market has decisively diversified: Russia’s Africa Corps remains the junior partner in combat operations in Mali, but Türkiye, Algeria and, in a narrower way, the United States are now competing for influence with the juntas, which raises the cost of Western disengagement and complicates any jihadist containment strategy (moderate confidence).

Great-Power Competition and Continental Diplomacy

The window’s diplomacy was organised less around the African Union than around external capitals, above all Washington and Ankara, with Algiers and Israel reshaping the Sahel and the Maghreb. The United States sent its clearest signal of the year that it regards Russian expansion beyond the Sahel as a strategic red line. Lieutenant General John Brennan, deputy commander of US Africa Command, warned Madagascar’s military government against importing what he called the “Sahel model”, citing the strategic value of Madagascar and Mozambique to international shipping, Africanews reported. Madagascar’s leader, Michaël Randrianirina, who came to power after the 2025 military takeover, made the first official visit by a Malagasy head of state to Moscow in nearly five decades in February, and Russia has since supplied weapons and instructors. The warning matters because it links the Mozambique Channel, where an Islamic State affiliate is developing maritime capabilities according to Brennan, to the competition for Africa’s Indian Ocean flank. The same officer called the US exit from Somalia’s Baledogle airfield “100% an economic decision”, Stars and Stripes reported. Washington is therefore simultaneously pruning its footprint and sharpening its rhetoric, a combination that African governments are likely to read as a demand for alignment without a matching offer of capability (moderate confidence).

Türkiye emerged as the most active middle power of the period, helped by its hosting of COP31 in Antalya, where Abiy Ahmed, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Libya’s Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah and Morocco’s Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita were all present. Ankara’s ambassador in Abuja restated a $5 billion bilateral trade target with Nigeria, up from roughly $2 billion today, and recalled agreements on attack helicopters, drones and special forces training signed during President Tinubu’s January state visit, ThisDay reported. In Libya, Ankara’s maritime memorandum, which the eastern-based House of Representatives approved in October, continues to divide the Mediterranean: Greece has rejected it and Egypt has called it null and void, while Cairo’s foreign minister said this week that talks with Tripoli on the deal are under way. Turkish influence now spans the Horn, the Sahel and North Africa, and it operates through hardware, mosques, schools and contractors at the same time, which makes it harder to counter than Russia’s narrower security offer (moderate confidence).

Algeria’s deployment of troops into Niger is the most consequential new military fact in the region. Units of the People’s National Army reached Arlit, the uranium town in northern Niger, in late October after parliament unanimously approved the move on 25 October, the first operation of Algerian troops abroad since 1973, according to Hespress. Algiers links the mission to its energy interests, including Sonatrach’s Kafra field and the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline. When the European Commission’s spokesperson asked for clarity on the scope and legal basis of the operation, Niger summoned the EU envoy and Algeria’s parliament denounced the remarks as interference. The episode shows that the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is not simply a Russian client bloc: Niamey is willing to host a neighbour’s army whose relationship with Mali’s junta remains tense, and Algeria is turning a decade of diplomatic positioning into boots on the ground. We judge that Algeria’s presence will be framed as infrastructure protection but will draw it into contact with jihadist and smuggling networks in the Aïr and Ténéré, with real risk of casualties within months (low to moderate confidence).

Israeli defence diplomacy concentrated on the Maghreb. Israel’s Defence Ministry Director General Amir Baram inaugurated the permanent premises of Israel’s first defence attaché office in Rabat, headed by Col. Sharon Itach, and the ministry said Israeli firms are helping build a Moroccan defence industry through joint ventures and offsets, The Times of Israel reported. The same day the Polisario Front’s National Secretariat declared a “state of general mobilisation”, accusing Morocco of massing troops and equipment along the berm, according to the Sahrawi Press Service. The sequence suggests that Western Sahara is moving from a frozen conflict toward an armed, low-intensity contest in which external defence partnerships, rather than UN mediation, set the pace (moderate confidence).

The Sahel and West Africa: Juntas, Jihadism and Instability

The central Sahel’s war is increasingly an air war conducted with cheap drones against populations whose location is treated as evidence of guilt. A synthesis by the Africa Defense Forum, a US Africa Command publication, cites ACLED data that Africa Corps and the Malian junta killed 89 civilians in 49 airstrikes between April and August, more than double the same period a year earlier, and draws on Bellingcat, The Sentry and Human Rights Watch to describe a “guilt by location” targeting pattern. Its data come from independent monitors, and Human Rights Watch documented new abuses by the army and Africa Corps in October. Mali’s acquisition of Shahed-type kamikaze drones alongside Turkish TB2s extends strike range but not targeting discipline. We assess that this campaign is a recruitment asset for Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and for the Azawad Liberation Front, and that the junta’s battlefield gains in the north are unlikely to be durable without a political track (high confidence).

Burkina Faso’s crisis took a new and economic form. The national relief agency CONASUR said 26,624 people, including 5,458 children, had been received at Bobo-Dioulasso by 10 November after Guinea expelled foreign artisanal gold miners following its suspension of small-scale mining in early November, the Rio Times reported citing official figures also carried by leFaso.net. The returnees come home to a country where much of the rural economy is contested by JNIM, and their lost remittances will strain an already war-hollowed economy.

That emergency is cross-border. The UN refugee agency said about 64,000 people have fled northern Nigeria into Niger since the start of 2026, with roughly 1,200 entering Diffa and 3,400 entering Tahoua in October alone, and only about 5 percent of this year’s arrivals registered for lack of funds, UN News reported. Niger already hosted about 327,500 Nigerian refugees before this year, and Diffa accounts for more than 70 percent of Niger’s reported security incidents. These flows indicate that Nigeria’s north-east and north-west are not stabilising despite Abuja’s claims, and that the jihadist ecosystem around Lake Chad, including the Islamic State West Africa Province, retains the initiative in rural areas (high confidence). West Africa’s coastal states remain exposed. Spain seized 2.6 tonnes of cocaine in containers shipped from Ghana, a seizure CitiNewsroom framed as evidence that Ghana has become a major transit hub. The convergence of narcotics, gold and arms trafficking along the Gulf of Guinea littoral is a known financing channel for Sahelian groups.

Sudan and the Horn of Africa

The Horn is now a single theatre in which Sudan’s civil war, Ethiopia’s internal wars and the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation are mutually reinforcing. Getachew Reda’s accusations against Isaias Afwerki and al-Burhan follow a chain of escalatory steps: Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and expelled ten Eritrean diplomats on 1 October, ordered six Sudanese diplomats out on 4 November after Sudan closed its Assosa consulate, and saw Sudan close Ethiopia’s Gedaref consulate the next day, according to Addis Standard. Sudan, for its part, has lodged complaints at the UN Security Council accusing Ethiopia of letting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) use its territory for drone attacks; both governments deny the charges against them. The G7’s warning of regional escalation, reported by Addis Standard, and a second letter from five US senators urging Secretary of State Marco Rubio to act, show that Western capitals now see an interstate war as plausible. On the ground, residents reported that more than 65 people were killed in an armed attack in Benishangul-Gumuz’s Assosa Zone, near the Sudanese border, Addis Standard reported; casualty figures are attributed to residents and have not been confirmed by authorities.

Ethiopia’s diplomatic standing is paradoxical. Washington formally removed it from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations denial list in September, Military Africa recalled this week, and Addis Ababa will host COP32 in November 2027, with its foreign minister arriving in Antalya as president-designate, according to Addis Standard. Yet the Famine Early Warning Systems Network expects drought and conflict to drive Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in the north through May 2027, and Tigray’s displaced fear renewed war. We judge that Abiy’s government will continue to use climate diplomacy and the Red Sea access agenda to secure international cover while prosecuting military campaigns at home, and that this dual track will not prevent further deterioration in Amhara, Tigray and the western borderlands (moderate confidence).

Inside Sudan, the drone has become the defining weapon of the war. UNICEF said 410 children were killed or injured between January and September, about two-thirds of them by armed drones, and that up to 825,000 children under five face the deadliest form of malnutrition this year; UNICEF spokesman James Elder said “drones and drought are closing in on Sudan’s children from both sides”, Arab News reported from the Geneva briefing. An RSF drone strike killed nine displaced civilians in Blue Nile state, according to a local official cited by Xinhua, while the army claimed to have shot down several RSF drones over Kordofan and Darfur and to be advancing in West Kordofan. These are statements of position by belligerents and should be treated as such. The political picture inside the army camp is also shifting: the detention of Ahmed Haroun, the former National Congress Party chief wanted by the International Criminal Court, was reported by party officials on 8 November, The National reported, although Sudan’s Emergency Lawyers said this week that the arrest has not been confirmed. Any genuine move against Haroun would indicate that al-Burhan is trying to distance the army from the Islamist current that helped its advances, possibly to court Gulf and Western backing (low confidence).

Somalia is in a constitutional rupture during a security handover. The Supreme Court ruled on 5 November that the extension of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term was unlawful and that he should have left office in May, Africanews reported. The president had dismissed Chief Justice Bashe Yusuf Ahmed on 4 November and appointed Ibrahim Idle Suleiman; the court declared that dismissal void and ordered leaders to agree an electoral framework within 30 days and hold elections within 90, according to the opposition statement carried by allAfrica. The opposition Somali Future Council, led by former president Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, accuses the government of a “coup against the Federal Supreme Court”, and the dismissed chief justice told Al Jazeera that security forces seized the court. Against that backdrop, the Future Council and the heads of the intelligence agency, police and army agreed in Mogadishu that security should not be politicised, that both sides will cooperate against al-Shabaab and the Islamic State, and that elections must rest on consensus, Shabelle Media reported. The agreement is a de-escalation device, not a settlement; the 30-day window set by the court expires in early December. We judge that Mogadishu avoided an armed confrontation this week, but that the risk of clan-aligned security fragmentation remains elevated as AU troop withdrawals proceed amid funding shortfalls (moderate confidence).

Al-Shabaab demonstrated reach into Kenya. Gunmen ambushed a security escort near Koromey on the Mandera-Arabia road on 10 November, killing five construction workers, two National Police Reservists and the escort’s driver, The Standard reported; no group claimed responsibility, but the pattern matched earlier al-Shabaab attacks. Another attack was reported foiled in Garissa. Shipping analysts also warned of rising Somali piracy risk in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin.

Central and Great Lakes Africa

The Democratic Republic of the Congo produced the period’s most important political decision. Tshisekedi signed on Monday a law, adopted by parliament in October and cleared by the Constitutional Court earlier, that sets out how a new constitution could be drafted and put to a referendum, Reuters reported via CNBC Africa and Bloomberg. The current constitution forbids parliament from revising term limits; a new constitution adopted by referendum would sidestep that lock. No referendum date has been set. Tshisekedi denies seeking a third term but says he would accept one if voters wished, and he warned in May that the 2028 elections might not proceed if parts of North and South Kivu remain under rebel control. That linkage between war and mandate is the heart of the risk: the longer the east remains contested, the stronger the incumbent’s argument for extraordinary measures (high confidence).

The army’s discipline crisis deepened. A military court in North Kivu sentenced 66 soldiers to death for cowardice, mutiny, refusing orders and squandering munitions after they allegedly fled fighting with the rebel coalition the court identified as the FRN, CBS News reported; since the start of 2025, 381 soldiers have been sentenced to death according to an RFI tally. Mass capital sentences are a symptom of an army that cannot hold ground against the M23-aligned coalition backed, according to the UN and Western governments, by Rwanda, and they are unlikely to restore cohesion. Meanwhile the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces killed at least 22 people and abducted at least 10 near the Ugandan border over two days, civil society groups told AP; the UN says more than 600 people have been killed and 345,000 displaced in Ituri this year.

The Ebola epidemic has become a strategic factor in its own right. Government data showed 11,042 confirmed cases and 5,387 deaths across eight of Congo’s 26 provinces, with many deaths occurring outside treatment centres, Reuters reported via CNBC Africa. The outbreak, declared in mid-May, is caused by the Bundibugyo species, for which there is no approved vaccine or treatment, and it is now the second-largest Ebola outbreak on record after West Africa’s 2014-2016 epidemic. Spread to the region is already a fact: Kenya discharged its last patient and began a 42-day countdown to an Ebola-free declaration on 23 December after nine cases and two deaths, the first imported from Congo via Uganda, Al Jazeera reported. We assess that the combination of war, mass displacement and a vaccine-less strain makes containment within 2026 unlikely, and that the outbreak will further erode state authority and the credibility of any 2028 electoral timetable (high confidence).

South Sudan, on the Great Lakes’ northern edge, is heading toward a 22 December election that the African Union envoy Jakaya Kikwete told the Security Council could trigger “an even bigger political and security crisis” if mishandled, AP reported via Arab News. Riek Machar remains under house arrest and on trial, and the National Elections Commission had not yet opened party registration. Amnesty International published findings on 12 November that UNMISS and the government had “sufficient information and time” to prevent the 1 March attack on Abiemnom, where more than 200 people were killed and more than 230 structures burned, Al Jazeera reported. UNMISS cited budget cuts after its troop ceiling was cut from 17,000 to 12,000 in April. The report will weigh on peacekeeping politics at the precise moment when the mission is needed most.

Country Watch

Nigeria was the most heavily reported country in the window, with 720 signals. President Tinubu launched the All Progressives Congress’s 2027-2031 manifesto, which puts security first and counts more than 108,000 recruits, including 50,000 police, 28,000 additional military personnel tied to the Army’s expansion from eight to twelve divisions, and 30,150 for the civil defence corps, Premium Times reported via allAfrica. The opposition African Democratic Congress accused the government of obstruction after Kaduna’s government sealed Arewa House, and the police chief cancelled officers’ leave ahead of the campaign. We judge that the pre-election period will see securitised campaigning, with the state’s coercive capacity used selectively against opposition mobilisation (moderate confidence).

Ethiopia, Sudan, DR Congo and Somalia are treated above, and their trajectory is uniformly negative. South Africa’s politics are still digesting the ANC’s local election setback reported in our previous edition; Pretoria is reportedly seeking Chinese market access amid fears of exclusion from the US African Growth and Opportunity Act. In Libya, a fire and explosion at the Marsa Brega gas complex killed one worker and injured four, while the National Oil Corporation discussed 2027 exploration with Repsol, TPAO and MOL. Kenya’s opposition dynamics sharpened as former president Uhuru Kenyatta pushed for opposition unity and declared that Ruto’s days in State House are numbered, while the Mandera ambush underlined the cost of the northern frontier. Ghana is balancing fiscal discipline with infrastructure ambitions: President John Mahama broke ground for a $137 million ship-repair facility and a $98 million berth at Takoradi port.

Morocco faced weather and security at once: storms damaged the national high-voltage grid and cut power across central Casablanca and Nouaceur province on 11 November, Hespress reported, while classes were suspended in several provinces and the south-east prepared for flash floods. The Israeli defence office and Polisario’s mobilisation make the eastern berm the issue to watch.

Economy, Resources, Debt and Markets

The window’s macro signal was mixed resilience under political stress. Nigeria’s total output of crude and condensate averaged 1.69 million barrels per day in October, with crude alone at 1.51 million, slightly above the 1.5 million OPEC quota for the sixth straight month, regulator data reported by Reuters via CNBC Africa show. The Guardian Nigeria reported Nigerian crude selling at about $94 a barrel, a price that supports Abuja’s 2027 budget arithmetic but also feeds fuel inflation. Morocco’s 2027 budget, by contrast, assumes $75 oil, Hespress noted, which makes Rabat vulnerable to the current price level.

Currency data from the monitor, quoted per US dollar from ExchangeRate-API, show the naira at about 1,349.82, the South African rand at 16.59 (weaker by 0.52 percent on the day), the Kenyan shilling at 129.97, the Ethiopian birr at 161.75, the Congolese franc at 2,310.38, the Ghanaian cedi at 11.71, the CFA franc (XOF) at 590.27 (weaker by 0.67 percent, tracking the euro), the Moroccan dirham at 9.80, the Algerian dinar at 136.63 and the Libyan dinar at 6.42. The Sudanese pound is quoted at 512.18, a 6.07 percent move toward fewer pounds per dollar on the day; given the gap between official and parallel markets in Sudan, this figure should be treated as an official-rate artefact rather than evidence of genuine appreciation. The Indonesian rupiah stood at about 18,166.94, weaker by 0.43 percent, a reminder that Southeast Asian currencies are under the same dollar pressure as African ones.

Humanitarian, Disasters and Climate Risk

Humanitarian need is rising faster than funding across every major theatre. OCHA reported that 71 aid workers were killed in Sudan in 2025, and UNICEF says its Sudan operation is only one-third funded. Ethiopia’s north faces Emergency outcomes through May 2027, Niger’s south-east is absorbing Nigerian refugees with only 5 percent registered, and South Sudan has an estimated 7.5 million people facing food insecurity ahead of the election. In Somalia, disease outbreaks surged after floods, straining health services.

Disaster signals were dominated by low-level seasonal fire alerts across the Sahel and by storms in Morocco. Climate diplomacy at COP31 offered little relief: African proposals to make tripling adaptation finance a standalone agenda item were rejected in the opening negotiations, Addis Standard reported, which will sharpen Ethiopia’s task as COP32 host.

Implications for Southeast Asia and Indonesia

For Indonesia and its ASEAN partners, Africa’s legitimacy crises have three practical consequences. The first concerns people. Indonesia is a significant contributor to UN peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and has personnel in other African missions, and the convergence of the ADF insurgency, M23-aligned fighting and a vaccine-less Ebola strain raises force-protection and medical-evacuation requirements for contingents and civilian staff. The Amnesty findings on UNMISS also put peacekeeping performance under scrutiny just as budget cuts thin missions; troop contributors from the Global South, Indonesia included, have an interest in insisting that mandates be matched by resources. Southeast Asian governments with citizens in eastern Congo, Kenya or Uganda should review travel advisories and screening protocols; Kenya now imposes a 21-day quarantine on citizens returning from Congo (high confidence).

The second concerns Muslim-majority diplomacy. The deepening Israel-Morocco military relationship, the Polisario mobilisation and Algeria’s sharp rejection of European criticism create competing demands on Jakarta, which maintains good relations with both Rabat and Algiers and has a domestic constituency sensitive to normalisation with Israel. In the Horn, Indonesia’s partners in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation are on opposing sides of the Sudan war and the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation, and Türkiye’s expanding footprint means Ankara is now a central interlocutor in Somalia, Libya and the Sahel. Indonesian mediation offers, if any, are best channelled through humanitarian access and electoral support in Somalia and Sudan rather than taking positions on contested sovereignty claims (moderate confidence).

The third concerns markets and networks. Nigerian crude near $94 a barrel and Gulf of Aden piracy risk both raise energy and freight costs for import-dependent Southeast Asian economies at a time when the rupiah is above 18,000 to the dollar. On security, the Sahel’s jihadist groups and Somalia’s al-Shabaab remain the most capable Islamist insurgencies globally; their propaganda circulates in Southeast Asian online spaces, and the drone tactics now normal in Mali and Sudan are the kind of capability that regional counter-terrorism agencies should monitor for diffusion (moderate confidence).

Indicators and Warnings for the Next 72 Hours

In the Horn, the key signposts are any confirmed exchange of fire or air strike between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, any formal response from Asmara or Khartoum to Getachew Reda’s accusations, further fighting or displacement in Benishangul-Gumuz, and Security Council activity on Sudan’s complaint against Ethiopia. In Sudan, watch drone strikes on power infrastructure, especially around Blue Nile and White Nile states, claims of advances in West Kordofan, and any official confirmation or denial of Ahmed Haroun’s detention. In Somalia, watch whether the government and the Future Council convene the follow-up talks announced for mid-November, whether the new chief justice takes his seat, troop movements in Mogadishu, and al-Shabaab activity on the Kenyan border after the Mandera ambush.

In Central Africa, the indicators are the publication of a referendum timetable or the formation of a constitutional drafting body in Kinshasa, opposition and church calls to protest, further capital sentences or desertions in the army, the weekly Ebola update and any confirmed cases outside the eight affected provinces or in a new neighbouring country, and ADF attacks in Ituri and North Kivu. In South Sudan, watch the opening of party registration, any change in Riek Machar’s status, and the government’s response to the Amnesty report. In the Sahel and West Africa, watch for the first reported clash involving Algerian troops in Niger, any Malian statement on Algeria’s deployment, further Africa Corps drone strikes on markets or vehicles, and new arrivals in Diffa and Tahoua. In the Maghreb, the critical signposts are any armed incident on the Western Sahara berm, Morocco’s response to Polisario’s mobilisation, and the tone of the UN General Assembly’s Fourth Committee debate. In markets, watch the naira and the rand, Bonny Light pricing, and any Somali piracy incident against a merchant vessel.

Method and Sources

This update covers the 72 hours from 9 November 2026, 11:41 WIB, to 12 November 2026, 11:41 WIB. It draws on 3,000 signals from 794 sources collected by the KBA13 Africa Intelligence Monitor, reviewed by country and by theme together with the Middle East monitor’s Egypt digest, and on original publisher reporting opened and cross-checked for each key development. Casualty figures and battlefield claims are attributed to their sources, statements by governments, juntas and armed groups are treated as statements of position, and exchange rates are quoted per US dollar from ExchangeRate-API. Confidence levels reflect source quality and corroboration at the time of writing.

About The Author

Article Identity · Identitas ArtikelDownload PDF

Series · Seri

KBA13 Insight Update, Africa Edition

Volume · Number

Vol. 2, No. 46 (November 2026)

Cumulative issue · Edisi ke-

58

Reference · Nomor rujukan

KBA13-IU-2026-02-046

Author · Penulis

KBA13 Insight Research Team

Published · Terbit

12 November 2026

Section · Rubrik

KBA13 Insight Update, KBA13 Insight Update International

Keywords · Kata kunci

Africa, DR Congo, Ebola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, Sahel, Somalia, Sudan

Language · Bahasa

English

Length · Panjang

4,209 words · ±19 min read

Publisher · Penerbit

KBA13 Insight, Banda Aceh, Indonesia

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How to cite · Cara mengutip

KBA13 Insight Research Team. (2026, November 12). KBA13 Insight Update – 12 November 2026: Africa – Ethiopia Accuses Eritrea and Sudan as Kinshasa Signs Its Referendum Law. KBA13 Insight Update, 2(46). https://www.kba13.com/kba13-insight-update-2026-11-12-africa/

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