Introduction
In 2023, trade between China and ASEAN soared to a record $975 billion, cementing China’s position as ASEAN’s largest trading partner and emphasizing its formidable economic influence in the region (ASEAN Secretariat, 2024). This milestone is not an isolated event but part of a consistent upward trend over the past decade. According to the World Bank, China-ASEAN trade has grown by over 80% since 2013, propelled by comprehensive trade agreements and deepening investment ties (World Bank, 2023).
China’s economic reach extends well beyond trading statistics. The implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2022, which includes China, ASEAN, and several other Asia-Pacific economies, has further reduced trade barriers and expanded market access (IMF, 2023). This agreement is expected to add $186 billion to the global economy by 2030 and foster even closer integration between China and Southeast Asia (Petri & Plummer, 2022). Infrastructure projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have also played a significant role, with investments in ports, railways, and industrial parks—such as the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail—directly linking ASEAN countries to Chinese supply chains (OECD, 2024).
As a result of these developments, many ASEAN countries have recalibrated their foreign and economic policies to accommodate China’s growing influence. Nations like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand have not only expanded trade with Beijing but have also entered into joint ventures, innovation partnerships, and educational exchanges to further solidify their ties. For example, the Singapore-China (Chongqing) Connectivity Initiative has facilitated digital and financial linkages, serving as a model for regional cooperation (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, 2023).
However, the relationship is not without its complexities and challenges. While ASEAN countries benefit from access to Chinese markets and investment, they also face risks associated with overdependence. Historical episodes, such as China’s rare-earth export restrictions in 2010 and economic coercion during diplomatic disputes with South Korea and Australia, highlight Beijing’s willingness to wield economic leverage as a tool of foreign policy (Lee & Lim, 2021). Consequently, several ASEAN members have sought to diversify their economic partnerships by pursuing agreements with the European Union, the United States, and India.
Beyond the economic sphere, China’s long-standing practice of intervening in the affairs of neighboring countries—often justified by economic interests—adds a layer of geopolitical tension. Maritime disputes in the South China Sea, for instance, have periodically strained relations between China and ASEAN members such as Vietnam and the Philippines (Storey, 2022). These issues underscore the delicate balance that ASEAN nations must strike: harnessing the benefits of Chinese economic engagement while safeguarding their sovereignty and regional stability. This article will examine in depth the multifaceted strategies China employs to shape the ASEAN economy, considering both the opportunities and risks that define this critical relationship.
China’s economic relationship with ASEAN
China’s role as the principal trading partner for many ASEAN nations is underscored by the volume and diversity of economic exchanges between the two blocs. By 2022, China accounted for nearly 20% of ASEAN’s total trade, surpassing both the European Union and the United States (ASEAN Secretariat, 2023). The region’s five largest economies—Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines—all conduct the majority of their external trade with China. This deep trade integration has been facilitated by a combination of geographic proximity, historical ties, and the evolution of regional supply chains (World Bank, 2022).
A comparison of economic sizes highlights the asymmetry that shapes the relationship. In 2016, China’s GDP was $11.2 trillion, and its population was 1.38 billion, whereas the collective GDP of ASEAN was $3.7 trillion and its population was 652 million (IMF, 2017). By 2023, China’s GDP had risen to approximately $17.7 trillion, while ASEAN’s combined GDP reached about $3.9 trillion, with both economies experiencing robust growth despite global headwinds (World Bank, 2023). This economic gap is a key factor in China’s ability to influence trade terms and investment flows within the region.
A crucial driver of China’s outsized economic influence is its burgeoning middle class. Between 2010 and 2022, China’s middle class grew from about 300 million to over 500 million people, with projections suggesting it could reach 700 million by 2025 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2021; Statista, 2024). This consumer demographic has driven demand for ASEAN products and services, ranging from palm oil and electronics to tourism and education. In response, many ASEAN businesses have aligned their strategies to capture a share of the Chinese market, deepening economic interdependence.
However, ASEAN leaders and policymakers are keenly aware of the risks associated with overreliance on a single partner. Despite the clear economic benefits, there is an ongoing effort to diversify trade and investment relationships. For instance, in 2022, ASEAN signed new agreements with the European Union and ramped up economic engagement with India and Japan, aiming to create a more balanced portfolio of partners (ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025). These efforts are seen as critical to enhancing regional resilience and reducing vulnerabilities to external shocks.
Regional perspectives on China’s economic ascendancy are nuanced. As Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Heng Swee Keat articulated at a 2022 economic forum, “ASEAN welcomes engagement with all major partners, including China, but we remain open and committed to diversification to safeguard our economic stability.” This sentiment captures the complex calculus facing ASEAN: while China offers immense opportunities for growth, maintaining strategic autonomy and economic security remains a top priority for the region (Channel NewsAsia, 2022).
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, formerly known as One Belt, One Road or OBOR)
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR), has become a cornerstone of China’s economic engagement with ASEAN and beyond. Launched in 2013, the BRI’s scope has expanded rapidly, encompassing over 140 countries and representing more than $1 trillion in pledged investments as of 2023 (World Bank, 2023). The transition in nomenclature from OBOR to BRI around 2016 signaled a broader, more multifaceted vision, which has been widely adopted in policy literature and international discourse (Rolland, 2017).
At its core, the BRI aims to build an extensive network of transport, energy, and digital infrastructure linking China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. For ASEAN, this means participation in a range of large-scale projects, including ports, highways, industrial parks, railways, and energy pipelines (ASEAN Policy Brief, 2022). The initiative is designed to facilitate trade, enhance regional connectivity, and promote economic integration. According to the Asian Development Bank, Southeast Asia faces an infrastructure investment gap of over $200 billion annually, making BRI support both timely and attractive (ADB, 2017).
Several flagship BRI projects highlight the profound impact and complexity of this initiative within ASEAN. The Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway in Indonesia stands as Southeast Asia’s first bullet train, opening in 2023 after years of construction delays and cost overruns (Reuters, 2023). In Malaysia, the East Coast Rail Link, a $12 billion project, is intended to connect the eastern and western coasts, boosting trade and logistics (The Straits Times, 2022). Meanwhile, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor includes a deepwater port at Kyaukpyu, a special economic zone, and a highway linking China’s Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal, providing Beijing with strategic access to the Indian Ocean (CSIS, 2021).
While the BRI promises major economic benefits, it has also generated concerns about debt sustainability, environmental impact, and transparency. Studies have shown that several ASEAN countries, such as Laos and Cambodia, face rising external debt levels linked to Chinese-financed BRI projects (Lowy Institute, 2022). Environmental groups have raised alarms over the impact of infrastructure construction on local ecosystems, while calls for greater transparency and local stakeholder engagement persist (World Bank, 2023).
Despite these challenges, the BRI remains a central pillar of China-ASEAN cooperation. Policymakers in the region generally view the initiative as a vehicle for growth, with ASEAN and China formally adopting the ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Synergizing the BRI with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 in 2019 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019). As the BRI continues to evolve, its long-term legacy in Southeast Asia will depend on how economic gains are balanced against risks and how local needs are integrated into project planning and implementation.
China’s military presence in Southeast Asia
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is widely recognized as a transformative economic project, but its broader implications for regional security have increasingly attracted scholarly and policy attention. Since its launch in 2013, the BRI has spanned more than 140 countries and involved investments exceeding $1 trillion, with Southeast Asia serving as a crucial hub for many flagship projects (World Bank, 2023). While the BRI’s stated goal is to promote connectivity and economic growth, its integration of transport, energy, and digital infrastructure has raised concerns about potential dual-use applications, particularly in sensitive geopolitical environments (Rolland, 2019).
The “One Road” component of the BRI, which references the ancient maritime Silk Road, involves extensive infrastructure development across regions that have historically experienced instability, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and parts of Southeast Asia. In South Asia, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has linked western China to the Arabian Sea, providing Beijing with critical port access at Gwadar—projects that have faced security risks from local insurgencies and geopolitical rivalries (Small, 2020). In Southeast Asia, major BRI-linked ports in Myanmar (Kyaukpyu) and Cambodia (Sihanoukville) have sparked speculation about their potential utility to the Chinese navy, especially given their strategic locations near key shipping lanes (CSIS, 2021).
While economic development and regional integration remain the primary aims of BRI projects in Southeast Asia, the scale and nature of the investments have prompted debate about their security implications. Analysts such as Jonathan Hillman (2020) argue that BRI-funded ports and logistics corridors could, in theory, provide the Chinese military with greater logistical access in a crisis, particularly if host nations are heavily indebted or politically aligned with Beijing. For example, a 2017 report by the Lowy Institute flagged concerns about dual-use infrastructure in Cambodia, noting the expansion of Ream Naval Base with Chinese support (Lowy Institute, 2017; Reuters, 2023).
Nevertheless, it is vital to distinguish between the predominantly economic motivations behind most BRI projects and the possibility of their secondary strategic use. Many ASEAN governments, including Indonesia and Malaysia, have emphasized transparency and local oversight in BRI agreements to allay fears of inadvertent militarization (ASEAN Policy Brief, 2022). Empirical studies suggest that, to date, most BRI infrastructure in the region remains civilian in nature, with tangible benefits for local economies and limited evidence of direct military use (World Bank, 2023).
In summary, while the Belt and Road Initiative’s primary orientation is toward economic development and connectivity, the potential for its projects to serve secondary strategic purposes cannot be dismissed outright. Policymakers and regional analysts continue to monitor evolving BRI developments, advocating for robust governance, transparent agreements, and multilateral engagement to ensure that economic cooperation does not inadvertently undermine regional security (ADB, 2022; Storey, 2022). The ongoing dialogue between ASEAN members and China will be crucial in shaping the future trajectory of BRI projects in Southeast Asia.
Chinese Diaspora in ASEAN
The Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia is a significant economic and political force, both historically and in the present day. Large-scale migration from China to the region began in earnest during the 19th century, especially following the Opium Wars and economic turmoil in southern China (Wang, 1991). Today, ethnic Chinese communities are deeply embedded in the social and economic fabric of many Southeast Asian countries, with the largest populations found in Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In Malaysia, for instance, ethnic Chinese make up about 23% of the population, while in Singapore they constitute around 76%, and in the Philippines, estimates range up to 20% (Statistics Singapore, 2022; World Bank, 2023; Gomez & Hsiao, 2019).
The economic impact of the Chinese diaspora is especially prominent in the business sector. Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs control a disproportionate share of private wealth and business assets in Southeast Asia, particularly in countries like Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. According to a 2018 Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report, Chinese business conglomerates dominate sectors such as banking, retail, manufacturing, and real estate across the region. This influence has facilitated trade and investment ties between Southeast Asian economies and China, often serving as a bridge for cross-border business ventures and capital flows (Yeung, 2014).
Politically, the Chinese diaspora has often played a mediating role between China and its host countries. Beijing has at times leveraged diaspora networks to promote soft power and advance diplomatic interests, including through cultural exchanges, educational programs, and the establishment of Chinese-language media outlets (Suryadinata, 2017). The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council has actively encouraged diaspora engagement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), viewing ethnic Chinese abroad as key stakeholders in advancing economic connectivity (Tan, 2018).
However, the influence of the Chinese diaspora is far from uniform or uncontested. In Indonesia, for example, the ethnic Chinese community has historically faced waves of discrimination and violence, most notably during the anti-Chinese riots of 1998. As a result, Chinese Indonesians have often sought to assert their national identity and distance themselves from direct ties to Beijing (Setijadi, 2017). Similar dynamics are evident in Vietnam and Thailand, where local Chinese communities have integrated extensively and, in some cases, resisted political alignment with China (Chirot & Reid, 1997).
These complexities highlight that while diaspora communities can serve as economic and cultural bridges for Chinese interests, they are not a monolithic bloc. Many overseas Chinese maintain strong loyalties to their countries of citizenship and may actively resist external influence from Beijing, especially where local integration or historic tensions are at play. Policymakers in both China and ASEAN must therefore navigate a nuanced reality: the Chinese diaspora can facilitate engagement but cannot be reliably counted on to advance Beijing’s agenda in all contexts (Gomez & Hsiao, 2019; Suryadinata, 2017).
China’s economic interests in ASEAN
China’s economic interests in ASEAN are multifaceted and deeply intertwined with the region’s development trajectory. The ten ASEAN nations—particularly the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia—are consistently among the top importers of Chinese goods (ASEAN Secretariat, 2023). In 2022, ASEAN’s total imports from China exceeded $520 billion, accounting for nearly 25% of the bloc’s total imports (World Bank, 2023). This trade relationship is mutually beneficial in many respects, but it also gives China considerable leverage as a supplier of manufactured goods, electronics, and machinery.
China’s strategic objectives in maintaining high export volumes to ASEAN go beyond mere commercial gain. By ensuring that Southeast Asian countries remain dependent on Chinese supply chains, Beijing strengthens its position as an indispensable economic partner. This dependency is reinforced through preferential trade agreements, competitive pricing, and the integration of Chinese firms into key ASEAN industries (Petri & Plummer, 2022). Major Chinese investments in regional infrastructure—such as ports, railways, and special economic zones—further bind ASEAN economies to China’s economic orbit (OECD, 2024).
However, several ASEAN countries are actively seeking to diversify their economies and reduce overreliance on Chinese goods. Initiatives such as the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 and new trade agreements with the European Union, Japan, and India aim to broaden trade partnerships and enhance regional resilience (ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, 2021). Despite these efforts, China continues to adjust its policies to maintain export competitiveness and market share in the region, including offering incentives for Chinese companies to invest in ASEAN manufacturing, logistics, and technology sectors (UNCTAD, 2023).
A controversial aspect of China’s economic strategy has been its approach to currency management. Throughout the past decade, China has faced accusations of manipulating the value of the renminbi (RMB) to boost exports, making Chinese goods cheaper and imports relatively more expensive for foreign buyers (IMF, 2020). Two prominent episodes include the 2015 devaluation of the RMB—when the People’s Bank of China abruptly lowered the official exchange rate to counter a slowing domestic economy—and the 2019 depreciation amid escalating trade tensions with the United States (Eichengreen & Kawai, 2015; Reuters, 2019). These moves have sparked concern among ASEAN policymakers, who worry about the impact of currency fluctuations on regional trade balances.
By keeping the RMB artificially low during periods of economic uncertainty, China can flood ASEAN markets with competitively priced exports. This practice, while benefiting ASEAN consumers through lower prices, can undermine local industries and complicate efforts to diversify supply chains. As a result, the economic relationship remains highly asymmetrical, with China seeking to preserve its dominant position while ASEAN nations strive for greater economic autonomy and resilience (World Bank, 2023; ASEAN Policy Brief, 2022).
Beijing’s toolkit for ASEAN nations
China wields a multifaceted toolkit to influence its neighbors, with trade and currency management as its most prominent levers. Trade remains the primary channel: as the largest trading partner for most ASEAN nations, China can impact the flow of goods, impose trade restrictions, or offer preferential terms to influence diplomatic outcomes (ASEAN Secretariat, 2023). For example, China has been known to impose informal trade barriers during periods of political tension, as seen in the case of rare earths with Japan in 2010 and agricultural products with the Philippines in 2012 (Lee & Lim, 2021).
Beyond trade, China’s currency policy is another powerful tool. By actively managing the value of the renminbi (RMB), Beijing can make Chinese goods relatively cheaper or more expensive, impacting ASEAN’s import and export competitiveness (IMF, 2020). The People’s Bank of China routinely intervenes in the foreign exchange market, buying or selling RMB to maintain a target exchange rate. This was evident during the 2015 and 2019 RMB devaluations, which increased the attractiveness of Chinese exports across Southeast Asia (Eichengreen & Kawai, 2015; Reuters, 2019).
China’s currency maneuvering has direct effects on ASEAN economies. When the RMB is kept weak, ASEAN countries find Chinese goods more affordable, which can crowd out local industries and increase dependence on Chinese imports (World Bank, 2023). Conversely, a stronger RMB could make ASEAN exports to China more competitive, though it might dampen Chinese demand for ASEAN goods. This dynamic underscores how currency policy is not merely a domestic concern but a regional economic weapon with far-reaching implications.
These economic tools are augmented by additional strategies, such as financing infrastructure projects through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and leveraging Chinese investment in key ASEAN industries. BRI investments often come with conditions that foster deeper integration of ASEAN economies into Chinese supply chains, further enhancing Beijing’s influence (OECD, 2024). In some cases, China also uses its large domestic market as leverage, offering access or imposing restrictions to reward or penalize ASEAN countries based on their political alignment with Beijing’s interests (Petri & Plummer, 2022).
The cumulative effect of these tools is a sophisticated system of economic statecraft. By combining trade, currency, investment, and market access, China is able to maintain a strategic edge in regional economic relations. Policymakers in ASEAN are increasingly aware of these dynamics and are crafting policies aimed at reducing vulnerabilities, including diversifying trade partnerships and strengthening domestic industries (ASEAN Policy Brief, 2022). The evolving toolkit underscores the complexity of China’s approach to regional influence and the challenges facing ASEAN as it seeks to balance economic engagement with strategic autonomy.
Conclusion
China holds significant economic power over ASEAN nations, which is evident in both the immense trade volumes between the two and the vast number of infrastructure projects led by Chinese companies across the region. In 2023, trade between China and ASEAN reached a record $975 billion, making China the bloc’s largest trading partner (ASEAN Secretariat, 2024). Additionally, Chinese investments in major infrastructure projects—such as ports, railways, and industrial parks under the Belt and Road Initiative—have deepened economic linkages and increased Beijing’s influence in Southeast Asia (World Bank, 2023; OECD, 2024).
These construction projects are part of China’s strategy to secure its economic dominance through expansionism and integration of regional supply chains. By financing and building critical infrastructure, China not only facilitates trade flows but also embeds itself in the economic lifelines of ASEAN economies. For example, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail in Indonesia and the East Coast Rail Link in Malaysia are emblematic of how Chinese-backed projects can shift trade patterns and foster long-term dependencies (CSIS, 2021; The Straits Times, 2022).
China’s approach to economic engagement is underpinned by a willingness to intervene in the affairs of other countries to secure its interests. This has included the use of economic leverage to influence political outcomes, as seen in the imposition of trade restrictions during diplomatic disputes with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines (Lee & Lim, 2021). Instances of “debt-trap diplomacy” have also been cited, where unsustainable loans linked to infrastructure projects have exposed several ASEAN countries to financial vulnerabilities (Lowy Institute, 2022).
In response, ASEAN nations have increasingly recognized the importance of reducing overdependence on Chinese goods and investments. Efforts include diversifying trade partners, enhancing intra-ASEAN trade, and pursuing new agreements with the European Union, Japan, and India (ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, 2021). Strengthening domestic industries and investing in supply-chain resilience are also seen as essential steps for safeguarding regional economic autonomy (Petri & Plummer, 2022).
Looking ahead, the question remains: what collective strategy will ASEAN craft to ensure a balanced and resilient economic future amid China’s growing influence? Regional experts suggest that greater policy coordination, joint investment in critical infrastructure, and mechanisms for economic risk-sharing could help ASEAN maintain both growth and autonomy (World Bank, 2023; ASEAN Policy Brief, 2022). As the region navigates the complexities of economic engagement with China, strategic foresight and unity will be key to shaping a sustainable and secure future.
To move beyond simply diagnosing these challenges, ASEAN policymakers must adopt a comprehensive, multi-pronged approach to economic resilience. Leading analysts have argued that the region’s future security and prosperity will depend on proactive measures to counterbalance China’s economic influence (World Bank, 2023; ASEAN Policy Brief, 2022). Establishing clear, actionable strategies is essential not only for managing vulnerabilities but also for unlocking new growth opportunities that can benefit all member states.
One practical step is to establish a regional supply-chain resilience fund. Such a fund could be capitalized by ASEAN members and international partners, with the aim of investing in industries and infrastructure to diversify import sources and increase regional production capacity. For example, the Asian Development Bank has highlighted the need for over $200 billion in annual infrastructure investment to close Southeast Asia’s infrastructure gap and reduce reliance on single-country suppliers (ADB, 2017). This fund could prioritize sectors such as semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and green technologies—areas where ASEAN’s collective potential is under-realized.
Another recommended measure is the implementation of joint currency-swap agreements among member states. ASEAN has previously experimented with such frameworks, notably through the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), a multilateral currency swap arrangement among ASEAN+3 countries (ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea). Expanding and deepening these agreements could provide a regional buffer against currency volatility and external shocks, especially those related to Chinese monetary policy or global financial instability (IMF, 2020; AMRO, 2022).
In addition, ASEAN could bolster its economic autonomy by harmonizing regulatory standards, developing digital trade infrastructure, and implementing investment screening mechanisms. For instance, the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework Action Plan 2023-2025 aims to standardize e-commerce protocols and data governance, making it easier for regional businesses to scale without overdependence on external digital giants (ASEAN Secretariat, 2023). Investment screening, meanwhile, can help protect critical sectors from undue foreign influence, ensuring that strategic projects align with long-term regional interests (OECD, 2024).
By pursuing coordinated, diversified strategies, ASEAN countries could not only mitigate economic vulnerabilities but also foster a stronger, more self-reliant regional economy. These initiatives, supported by international best practices and robust multilateral cooperation, are vital to ensuring ASEAN’s collective prosperity and autonomy amid intensifying economic competition and geopolitical uncertainty (Petri & Plummer, 2022; World Bank, 2023).
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